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EDITORIAL
At the beginning of May 1998, European Union 
leaders took the historic decision to move to the 
Third Stage of Economic and Monetary Union 
and introduce the euro on 1 January 1999. Ten 
years later, EMU is one of the greatest 
achievements of EU integration with 320 million 
European citizens from Helsinki to Dublin and 
from Lisbon to Nicosia sharing the same 
currency and enjoying its numerous benefits.  
To mark this occasion, the European 
Commission presented a Communication and 
accompanying report, 'EMU@10: Successes and 
challenges after 10 years of Economic and 
Monetary Union', that reviews the experience of 
the first decade of EMU and looks at its future. 
Exceptionally, this Quarterly Report on the Euro 
Area is entirely devoted to EMU@10. 
The first decade of the euro shows that EMU is a 
resounding success. It has helped to deliver 
macroeconomic stability through a sound single 
monetary policy and much improved fiscal 
behaviour in member countries. It has ushered in 
an unprecedented period of price stability and 
low interest rates, bringing substantial savings for 
consumers and business. The single currency has 
also supported trade and investment and 
deepened financial integration. Economies in the 
euro area have become more integrated, better 
synchronised, better managed and more flexible 
in the last 10 years. 
The combination of enhanced stability, deeper 
integration and structural reforms has also had a 
striking impact on the labour market. 
Sixteen million jobs have been created since 
1999, a much greater number than in the decade 
before and more than in the United States during 
the same period. As a consequence, the 
unemployment rate fell to 7% in 2007, its lowest 
level in 15 years.  
Can EMU deliver further benefits in the future? 
Undoubtedly, yes. Its full potential for citizens 
and business has not yet been realised. Although 
there have been significant, and persistent, 
differences across euro-area countries, overall 
productivity growth in the euro area has been 
disappointing compared with the performance 
registered in other developed economies. While 
lower-than-expected productivity growth cannot 
be directly attributed to the euro, it reflects a 
backlog in structural reform in many Member 
States of the euro area. The euro has not so far 
been enough of a catalyst for structural reforms. 
With more decisive steps to modernise euro-area 
economies and make them more competitive, 
building on those already taken under the EU's 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs, the euro 
area should be able to take even greater 
advantage of the single currency. Member States 
must both be more ambitious and honour their 
commitments by adopting reforms that will 
unleash the potential of their economies in terms 
of jobs and growth and by promoting more 
competitive services markets – including financial 
markets – and better-functioning labour markets. 
These efforts are particularly necessary in EMU 
because, in the absence of national monetary and 
exchange rate policy, the onus of adjustment to 
country-specific shocks rests mainly on the 
flexibility of product and labour markets and on 
developed and well-functioning financial 
markets. 
In addition, new and pressing challenges that 
were not apparent when EMU was devised have 
emerged. Globalisation, demographic change, 
higher energy and food prices and climate change 
are putting further strains on the growth 
potential of the euro-area economy and threaten 
price stability. Also the current financial turmoil 
is a manifestation of how shocks are transmitted 
in the global economy. Moreover, the 
progressive enlargement of the euro area will 
make economic structures in the euro area 
increasingly diverse, requiring effective and 
smooth intra-area adjustment. A more resilient 
economy will also be necessary in view of the 
unwinding of global imbalances which may have 
a highly asymmetric impact among euro-area 
economies. 
These challenges demand that we swiftly 
improve further the functioning of EMU for the 
next decade and beyond in order to make the 
euro-area economy more adaptable and dynamic. 
In order to prepare EMU for the future, the 
Commission has presented a three-pillar policy 
  
 
 
 
agenda in its EMU@10 Communication and 
Report, based on a domestic pillar, an external 
pillar and initiatives to strengthen EMU’s 
economic governance. 
The domestic pillar of the policy agenda includes 
two strands. First, fiscal surveillance in EMU 
must be deepened. The effectiveness of the 
preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact 
must be improved in order to ensure sound fiscal 
behaviour over the whole cycle. Second, 
macroeconomic surveillance and the 
coordination of economic policies must be 
deepened and broadened in order to deal with 
the damage that persisting macroeconomic 
imbalances may inflict on a country's 
competitiveness and growth potential. It is also 
important to identify risks linked to financial 
stability early on, so that they can be addressed 
before they become entrenched. The pace at 
which our economies are modernised and 
barriers between them broken down needs to be 
stepped up. This will help adjust the euro area to 
changing conditions and weather external shocks.  
The second pillar relates to the external agenda. 
The euro is already the second most important 
currency in the world, so there is a strong case 
for the euro area to increase its presence in the 
global arena. The euro-area members must be 
able to define, agree and then stick to common 
positions, to be able to speak with a single voice 
in international fora such as the International 
Monetary Fund. Only then will the euro be able 
fully to play its role as a major international 
currency in shaping the international economy. 
Finally, the third pillar of the policy agenda aims 
at improving EMU's governance. The current set 
of institutions and instruments which govern 
EMU is sound. But we can make better use of 
them to tackle emerging policy challenges. 
National economic and budgetary policies are a 
matter of common concern, so those policies 
need to be better coordinated within the 
Eurogroup and the ECOFIN. These two fora 
should capitalise on their respective forces and 
complement each other more fully. The 
ECOFIN Council should be firmly at the centre 
of our system of governance, integrating issues 
related to EMU in its work, whereas the 
Eurogroup will continue to be an important 
forum for frank exchanges among EMU 
members beyond this first decade. 
This 10th anniversary of EMU is also a special 
date for me personally, as I will be leaving DG 
ECFIN after 7 years as Director-General. Having 
already worked on the preparations for EMU in 
Germany, it was a real privilege for me to work 
on managing and developing its operational 
framework during my time here at DG ECFIN. 
While my stay at the Commission has seen many 
challenges for EMU, it has been deeply 
rewarding for me to see the great strides 
monetary union has made in its functioning and 
how powerfully the euro has emerged as an 
international currency. I am confident that the 
next decade of EMU will be equally rich in 
achievement.  
I have also had the pleasure of observing the 
successful evolution of the Quarterly Report on 
the Euro Area (QREA) since its birth in March 
2002, only months after my arrival in DG 
ECFIN in 2001. I have seen it grow in depth, 
substance and analytical rigour to occupy a 
prominent place in the public debate on EMU's 
economic policy. I believe that the Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area has made a significant 
contribution towards disseminating ECFIN's 
analytical work and views on many important 
empirical debates surrounding economic policy 
in the euro area.  
 
 
Klaus REGLING  
DIRECTOR GENERAL  
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EMU@10 
I. The first ten years: a resounding success  
After a decade of preparations, the decision to move to the final stage of EMU was taken in early May 1998, and on 1 
January 1999 the euro became the official currency in eleven EU member countries, followed by four members in later years. 
Ten years on, the time is ripe for a first comprehensive assessment of how it is functioning. Drawing extensively on the 
European Commission Report 'EMU@10: Successes and challenges after 10 years of Economic and Monetary Union', the 
overall findings suggest that EMU has been a resounding success. It has secured macroeconomic stability – supported by 
sound monetary policy and much improved fiscal behaviour in member countries – and boosted cross-border trade, financial 
integration, investment and employment. It has also brought significant benefits to euro-area member countries engaged in 
catching-up and has established the euro as the world's second international currency. It has nevertheless exhibited some 
weaknesses, as productivity growth has been below that of other developed economies while there have been substantial and 
persistent differences in macroeconomic performance across countries. This down side is not attributable to the euro per se but 
rather reflects both a backlog in structural reform in several member countries and an insufficient awareness of the policies 
required to ensure that a single currency area functions smoothly.  
On 1 January 1999, eleven EU Member States – 
Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal 
and Finland – adopted the European Union's 
single currency, the euro, in what may be 
considered to be the world’s most radical 
monetary reform since Bretton Woods.1 This 
move established the second largest single 
currency area in the world (after the United 
States), which now produces two thirds of the 
EU’s GDP and one fifth of the world’s. Four 
other EU Member States have joined the euro 
area since its inception: Greece in 2001, Slovenia 
in 2007 and Cyprus and Malta in 2008. The area 
is set to expand further as most EU Member 
States currently outside the euro area are 
preparing to join at some point in the future.2  
The establishment of a single currency for the 
EU – and the creation of the European Central 
1 The assessment draws on Part I of European Commission 
(2008), 'EMU@10, Successes and challenges after 10 
years of Economic and Monetary Union', European 
Economy, No. 2, 2008, which includes a Commission 
Communication and an analytical report by the 
Commission Services. It draws also on a number of 
papers written by external and Commission economists, 
published in a dedicated series of ECFIN Economic 
Papers. 
These documents are available at:  
http://www.ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu10/ind
ex_en.htm
2 All the EU countries currently not in the euro area, apart 
from Denmark and the United Kingdom, which have 
opted out of the single currency, are committed to join 
the euro area once they fulfil the convergence criteria 
established in the Treaty. 
Bank (ECB) – was a leap forward in the process 
of European economic integration. Although the 
origins of the single currency go back to the 
1970s, the process accelerated in the early 1990s 
when the lifting of the Iron Curtain and the 
ensuing political uncertainties prompted the 
perception that stronger common goal-setting in 
the EU was needed. This eventually led to the 
go-ahead for economic and monetary union, as 
laid down in the Maastricht Treaty signed in 
1992. From then onwards EU members willing 
to join the euro area in the first wave engaged in 
a process of convergence towards the reference 
values enshrined in the Treaty regarding price 
stability, exchange rate stability, interest rates, 
government net borrowing and government 
indebtedness.3 Eventually the eleven countries 
mentioned above qualified for participation in 
the first wave.  
In its first ten years, the euro-area economy went 
through approximately a full business cycle, 
moving from the peak of the cycle at the advent 
of the euro to its trough in the wake of the 
dotcom bust, followed by a first slow and then 
decisive recovery. This makes it easier to avoid 
                                                     
3  Specifically, in order to qualify a country needed to satisfy 
the following criteria: inflation not exceeding by more 
than 1 1/2 pp that of the three best-performing Member 
States in terms of price stability, and a sustainable price 
performance; long-term interest rates not exceeding by 
more than 2 pp that of the three best-performers on this 
measure; not being subject to a Council Decision on an 
excessive deficit; and observing the normal fluctuation 
margins of the ERM without severe tensions for at least 
two years. 
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wrongly attributing observed economic 
tendencies to permanent, as opposed to cyclical, 
developments. However, the assessment is 
complicated by the fact that many of the changes 
in governance structures and policy orientations 
prompted by the single currency were already 
ongoing in the run-up phase, including – 
importantly – the pursuit of the Maastricht 
convergence criteria. Moreover, many 
participating countries were clearly not entering 
the euro area under 'steady state' conditions, but 
were still grappling with past economic 
disturbances.  
1.  Initial goals and expectations  
Aside from the political motivations for the 
creation of a single currency for the EU, the euro 
was intended to serve a number of economic 
goals, which can be grouped under the following 
three headings: 
• Macroeconomic stability. The single currency 
was in part a response to past episodes of 
excessive exchange rate, output and inflation 
volatility. The underutilisation of resources 
stemming from high macroeconomic 
volatility was deemed to be costly in terms of 
both efficiency and equity – and hence its 
removal beneficial.  
• Growth and jobs. The single currency was 
deemed to be a decisive move towards the 
completion of the European single market 
established in 1992. The reduction in 
transaction costs and risk premiums 
associated with the single currency were 
expected to boost intra-area trade and 
finance. As the exchange rate risks and 
currency transaction cost would diminish or 
disappear, a better use of scarce resources 
could be achieved, not least because greater 
transparency would foster competition.  
• Cohesion and convergence. It was expected that 
closer integration would boost real economic 
convergence towards the best-performers. 
Moreover, as economies would become 
more similar, policies would become easier 
to co-ordinate as the importance of national 
desiderata diminished. 
Before it was created there was a lively academic 
and political debate on the viability or desirability 
of an economic and monetary union for the EU. 
There was a very broad spectrum of views on the 
subject: some predicted a bumpy start or even 
collapse, while others were more sanguine. 
However, many tended towards a pessimistic 
view. The assessments in the early years were 
also coloured by the global economic downturn 
in the early 2000s and the depreciation of the 
euro against the US dollar in the period 1999-
2002, both roughly coinciding with the run-up to 
and introduction of euro coins and notes in 2002. 
This is in contrast with the assessment in this 
section, from which emerges a predominantly 
favourable picture of the first ten years of the 
euro – even if weaknesses, shortcomings and 
unfinished business are also highlighted.  
But even its fiercest proponents saw the creation 
and management of the single currency as a 
major challenge, essentially for the following two 
reasons: 
• First, the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) is unique in that it comprises a 
single currency and monetary policy in 
combination with fiscal policies conducted at 
national level – albeit within a common 
framework – by its participating Member 
States. This is unlike federal monetary 
unions, like the United States, where a 
federal government is endowed with 
sovereignty to tax and to provide common 
public goods. The US federal budget acts as 
a stabiliser, enabling fiscal transfers to 
automatically flow from booming to 
slumping states, whereas the euro area has 
no such transfer mechanism.  
• Second, alternative mechanisms of adjustment 
in the euro area were deemed to be 
comparatively weak. Low labour mobility 
within and across borders, weak 
responsiveness of prices and wages to the 
business cycle, and the limited degree of 
integration of financial markets – along with 
the absence of cross-border fiscal transfers – 
were considered to create a risk of tensions 
between participating countries building up if 
their economies failed to move in sync. In 
such an environment the loss of the 
possibility of exchange rate adjustment could 
prove costly and the effectiveness of the 
single monetary policy – which by its nature 
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could only be geared towards the needs of 
the area as a whole – questionable.  
The use of fiscal policies to stabilise the national 
economies was seen as possible to some extent, 
but the experience of previous decades had given 
rise to growing scepticism. Indeed, from the 
outset it was recognised that countries would be 
tempted to 'free ride' in the absence of the 
disciplining effect of exchange-rate risk 
premiums, by running budget deficits while 
neglecting longer-term considerations of fiscal 
sustainability. The adverse effects of fiscal 
profligacy would be all the more damaging as 
they risked spilling over, thus inflicting instability 
onto the area and squeezing productive capital 
formation in other participating countries. It 
would also hinder the newly created ECB in 
doing its job of maintaining price stability and by 
extension, macroeconomic stability. 
These concerns led to the development of the 
convergence criteria for inflation, exchange rate 
stability, interest rates and public deficits and 
debt, which were enshrined in the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty, and which countries must 
comply with to qualify for euro-area accession. It 
also led to the adoption of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) in 1997 which fixes rules for 
fiscal policy and penalties if those rules are 
breached. Concretely, countries are required to 
move towards and sustain a fiscal position 'close 
to balance or in surplus' over the medium term 
and will be subject to corrective measures if the 
fiscal deficit exceeds 3% of GDP and/or if 
public debt fails to converge towards or below 
60% of GDP, unless 'special circumstances' can 
be demonstrated. Participating countries submit 
annually a Stability Programme which contains a 
record of current and planned fiscal outcomes 
and on which the assessment of compliance by 
the competent EU authorities (the European 
Commission and the Ecofin Council) is based.  
The concerns over the weak adjustment capacity 
of the countries participating in the euro area 
also led to a growing role for the EU's Lisbon 
Strategy, which was adopted in 2000 to 
orchestrate structural reforms in product, labour 
and financial markets. While the Strategy was 
designed to boost growth and jobs over the 
longer haul in the whole EU, there has been 
mounting evidence that structural policies also 
have favourable knock-on effects on the capacity 
of the countries participating in the euro area to 
respond to adverse shocks. As well, the 
integration and development of financial markets 
was seen to create opportunities for risk sharing 
and consumption smoothing, thus easing the 
stabilisation role of macroeconomic policies. 
Structural reforms within the Lisbon Strategy 
therefore became instrumental to enhancing the 
adjustment capacity of the euro-area Member 
States – both present and future.  
Against this backdrop, the sections below 
summarise the main findings with regard to the 
performance of the euro area, starting with the 
aggregate macroeconomic performance, followed 
by the record on cohesion and convergence, the 
conduct of macroeconomic policies, progress 
with structural reform and financial integration, 
the international role of the euro and the 
experience with the euro-area's economic 
governance. 
2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Low and stable inflation 
The European Central Bank (ECB) quickly 
established its credibility after the launch of the 
euro, laying the foundations for an environment 
of low and stable inflation. High inflation is 
potentially costly because it gives rise to an 
inflation risk premium embedded in long-term 
interest rates, blurs the price signals to 
consumers and producers and raises volatility in 
output and employment. The inflation 
performance of the euro area has decisively 
improved in comparison with previous decades, 
and this has been accompanied by greater 
stability also of GDP growth. 
Disinflation in the euro area actually took off in 
the 1980s and was further reinforced in the 
1990s as a result of the efforts to meet the 
Maastricht inflation criterion (Graph 1). Average 
inflation in the first ten years of the euro area was 
broadly on a par with the ECB's objective of 
price stability of close to but below 2%. And 
even though inflation is currently well above this 
mark due to hikes in energy and food prices, 
various gauges of long-term inflation 
expectations remain consistent with the price 
stability goal, suggesting that this goal is well 
anchored and credible. 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area II/2008 
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Box 1: Public perceptions of inflation in the euro area 
With the introduction of euro banknotes and coins in January 2002, the euro has become one of the most tangible 
symbols of European integration for the European citizens who use it. Since the introduction of euro cash, the 
European Commission has conducted regular opinion polls (Eurobarometer) to monitor citizens' attitudes towards 
the euro. These polls show that, overall, people support the single currency and that they adjusted fairly rapidly to it. 
They also show that citizens are aware of the benefits which the euro has brought – at least the microeconomic 
benefits such as the reduction of transaction costs, greater ease of travel and increased price transparency. On the 
other hand, the public remain more sceptical about the euro's positive impact on growth and employment and sound 
public finances. 
The Eurobarometer shows that citizens take a more positive view of the usefulness of the euro for the EU as a 
whole than for their own country. Around two thirds consider the euro to be 'a good thing for Europe', but less than 
half consider it to be a 'good thing for their country'. When citizens are asked about the usefulness of the euro for 
their country, support rates are highest in Ireland, Luxembourg, Belgium and Slovenia and lowest in Greece, 
Germany, Italy and Portugal. In terms of socio-economic groups, men are on average more positive than women, 
younger more than older people and citizens with higher education and higher incomes more than those with lower 
education levels or lower income levels (Jonung and Conflitti (2008)). 
Recent research carried out by the Commission services suggests that, aside from the socio-economic factors 
discussed above, popular support for the euro is correlated with inflation and, more specifically, perceptions thereof. 
Although there were on average no major price increases associated with the cash euro introduction, many citizens 
seem to hold a different view. Inflation perceptions, as measured by the European Commission’s Consumer Surveys, 
increased significantly with the euro cash changeover in 2002 left panel of graph below). 
A number of factors have been identified which could explain the perception gap in the euro-area countries. These 
include the relatively high price increases for frequently purchased goods (such as food or energy – see right panel of 
graph below), the steep increase in house prices in many countries, low increases in disposable income and various 
psychological factors (see Döhring and Mordonu (2007)). The perception gap must also be seen against the rather 
low awareness of the actual inflation rate. According to the latest Flash Eurobarometer results, two thirds of the 
respondents in the euro area either had a too high estimate of the actual inflation rate or admitted that they had no 
idea what it was. This gap remains a challenge for researchers to interpret although it is expected to diminish over 
time.  
 
Actual inflation and inflation perceptions, euro 
area 
Possible determinants of inflation perceptions, 
euro area 
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References:  
Döhring, B. and A. Mordonu (2007), 'What drives inflation perceptions? A dynamic panel data analysis', European 
Commission, European Economy – Economic Paper, No. 284, July.  
Jonung, L. and C. Conflitti (2008), 'Is the euro advantageous? Does it foster European feelings? Europeans on the 
euro after five years', European Economy – Economic Papers, No. 313, March 
The long-term decline in inflation has been 
observed also in other developed countries: the 
euro area is not unique in this respect. Even so, 
the institutional changes that have accompanied 
the creation of the single currency – such as the 
establishment of an independent central bank 
with a clear price stability mandate – have been 
instrumental in anchoring price developments in 
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the euro area. Meanwhile, the drive towards 
lower global inflation has been accompanied by 
rather radical shifts in relative prices, with prices 
of frequently purchased local services in 
particular rising, while those of less frequently 
purchased big-ticket items and services that are 
globally traded steeply fell. This may help explain 
the rather negative perceptions of the euro in 
many participating countries as the introduction 
of euro notes and coins roughly coincided with 
this change in relative prices (Box 1).  
Graph 1: Inflation performance of the euro area  
(in %, decade averages and standard deviations) 
0
2
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(1) Corresponds to the period since the start of Stage III of EMU, 
of which the last 2 years are forecast values. 
Source: Commission services.  
Massive job creation…  
Another tangible economic achievement in the 
first ten years of the euro area has been massive 
growth in employment – with the creation of 16 
million jobs and the unemployment rate falling 
from 9% in 1999 to an estimated 7% in 2008. 
This has occurred in spite of growing numbers of 
people approaching or exceeding retirement age, 
which shows that labour market participation has 
soared. Indeed, job growth has by far outpaced 
that in other mature economies with generally 
more favourable demographics, including the 
United States (Table 1). However, it would be 
inappropriate to attribute this achievement solely 
to the economic conditions generated by the 
single currency, and there is indeed evidence that 
labour market reforms in the 1990s have 
facilitated the labour market participation of 
'marginal' workers (e.g. with low skills or limited 
job histories). But it is unlikely that the job gains 
would have been as impressive under the more 
volatile monetary conditions and fiscal instability 
that used to prevail under the previous system. 
Table 1: Growth and employment 
(average annual changes in %) 
 1989-1998 1999-2008 
 Euro area 
Real GDP 2.2 2.1 
Real GDP per capita 1.9 1.6 
GDP per capita level 
(index, US = 100) 73 72 
Employment 0.6 1.3 
Labour productivity 1.6 0.8 
   
 United States  
Real GDP 3.0 2.6 
Real GDP per capita 1.8 1.6 
Employment 1.5 1.0 
Labour productivity 1.5 1.6 
Source: Commission services, OECD. 
…but weak productivity growth 
On a more negative note, there has been a 
significant productivity slowdown, with growth 
in output per worker halving from 1½% in the 
period 1989-1998 to an estimated ¾% in 1999-
2008 (Table 1). This is in sharp contrast with the 
more rapid pace of productivity growth observed 
in the United States. It largely explains why the 
euro area has seen its growth rate stalling at 
around 2% per annum, the same as in the 
preceding decade – despite a much faster growth 
in labour utilisation. Even so, there is evidence 
that the introduction of the single currency has 
favoured productivity as it has offered firms even 
greater opportunities to trade and specialise.4 
Without it, labour productivity would have been 
even weaker in the euro area than it has been. 
Moreover, on a per capita basis, output growth 
actually matched the US performance, although 
this means that the euro area's per capita income 
stalled at slightly over 70% of the US level. 
Obviously it is tempting to assume the recent 
jobs 'miracle' itself has caused the productivity 
slowdown. A trade-off between more jobs and 
productivity may indeed emerge if faster 
employment growth leads to a lower capital use 
                                                     
4  The single-currency effect on productivity is estimated to 
be 5% in the long run. See Barrell, R. et al. (2008), ‘The 
Impact of EMU on Growth and Employment’, European 
Economy – Economic Papers, No. 318. 
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per worker and if greater numbers of low-skilled 
workers are employed. But this combined effect 
is found to be small, indeed tiny in comparison 
with the impact of the slow development and 
diffusion of new technologies and best work 
practices.5 A number of euro-area countries are 
not yet fully reaping the benefits of the 
information technology revolution and the spurt 
in the global division of labour.  
Stronger resilience 
The euro area has historically tended to recover 
more slowly from economic downturns than the 
United States. The main culprit behind this lack 
of resilience is the comparatively greater rigidity 
of prices and wages in the euro area which 
inhibits a rapid adjustment of supply and demand 
towards equilibrium. However, the euro area's 
capacity to absorb adverse shocks has improved 
over the recent cycle, with the 2001-2003 
downturn having been shallower than 
comparable episodes in previous cycles.6 This is 
partly a reflection of a tendency towards 
smoother business cycles globally – the so-called 
'Great Moderation' – possibly owing to better 
macroeconomic management, international risk 
sharing and consumption smoothing across the 
industrialised world. But the stability-oriented 
macroeconomic policy framework adopted by 
the euro area itself has undoubtedly helped. 
Muted exchange rate volatility by historical 
standards 
After the launch of the euro on 1 January 1999 
the exchange rate quickly fell against other major 
currencies. Against the US dollar, it reached a 
low in June 2001, at USD 0.85 per euro. The 
exchange rate started to recover in mid-2002 and 
although the appreciation came to a temporary 
halt in 2005 it quickly resumed its upward trend, 
reaching a temporary high of close to USD 1.60 
in March 2008.  
5  For recent evidence see: Havik, K., K. McMorrow, W. 
Röger and A. Turrini (2008), ‘The role of total factor 
productivity in explaining EU–US productivity 
differences: A macro, sectoral and industry level 
perspective’, European Economy — Economic Papers, 
forthcoming. 
6  See European Commission (2007), 'The Resilience of the 
Euro-Area Economy', in Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, 
Vol. 6, No3, pp. 31-42. 
While the appreciation partly reflects the 
widening interest differential vis-à-vis US short-
term interest rates (Graph 2), it is also being 
driven by global imbalances, in particular the 
large deficit on the US current account and the 
associated surpluses in emerging economies (see 
Part II in this issue). A growing concern is that 
the exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis the US 
dollar may now have appreciated beyond its 
fundamental value. 
Graph 2: The euro-dollar exchange rate and the short-
term interest rate differential  
(1999Q1 -2008Q1) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Overall, however, the volatility of the nominal 
effective exchange rates of the euro-area member 
economies has been relatively muted by historical 
standards. The greater stability associated with 
the disappearance of intra-area exchange rate 
realignments has been a key factor of increased 
resilience in the euro area.7 Without the euro, the 
current episode of financial turbulence would 
undoubtedly have led to tensions in European 
exchange markets and associated instability.  
3.  Cohesion and convergence 
Converging business cycles 
One precondition for the favourable effects of 
EMU to materialise was always considered to be 
that the business cycles of the participant 
countries must be more or less in sync. 
Otherwise, the one-size-fits-all monetary policy 
would be less effective – i.e. too loose for 
buoyant economies and too tight for the others. 
                                                     
7  The standard deviation of the changes in the Member 
States nominal effective exchange rates has decreased 
steadily since the 1990s.  
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Analysis reported in Box 2 show that business 
cycles have become more synchronised between 
participating countries during the decade 
preceding the creation of the single currency – 
possibly driven by the establishment of the Single 
Market in 1992 and the joint policy efforts in the 
run-up to the euro. However, there have been no 
major further synchronisation gains since the 
single currency was created. In contrast, 
synchronisation between the euro area and the 
rest of the world has clearly accelerated. This 
suggests that the euro area as a whole has been 
moving more in step with an emerging global 
business cycle. 
Despite the greater synchronisation of business 
cycles at higher frequencies, there is evidence of 
a more differentiated behaviour over the medium 
term. Two of the three largest countries in the 
euro area (Germany and Italy) have posted 
considerably weaker growth than the average 
(Graph 3). In the case of Germany this reflects 
the fact that it still had to work off the 
consequences of unification and the associated 
real appreciation of its exchange rate. Hence, 
lower growth during the adjustment period laid 
the foundation for the current better economic 
performance. Italy's sluggish performance has 
been due to continued losses in competitiveness 
associated with weak productivity growth and an 
industrial structure that is particularly prone to 
competition from low-wage countries. By 
contrast, in the euro-area periphery a strong 
growth momentum had been building up prior to 
the introduction of the euro, owing to sharp 
declines in real interest rates along with 
successful structural reform and an associated 
strong growth potential.  
Moreover, at the time of the admission to the 
euro area, several participating countries had not 
yet fully completed their catching-up towards EU 
average living standards. Three of the four 
'cohesion countries' (Spain, Ireland and Greece) 
have since shown a strong growth performance, 
while the fourth (Portugal) has disappointed. The 
strong performers have been thriving on 
investment booms, spurred by capital inflows 
attracted by comparatively high rates of return, 
with the single currency and the integration of 
financial markets acting as a catalyst. The 
counterpart of this was, however, growing 
imbalances in the external accounts which will 
need to be addressed to ensure lasting growth. 
Key to the much weaker performance of 
Portugal has been the comparatively poor fiscal 
management, with the tax burden increasing 
while public expenditure has been growth-
unfriendly – i.e. diverted away from productive 
public capital formation. 
Overall, the divergences in growth and unit 
labour cost developments among the euro-area 
countries have been long-lasting, involving major 
shifts in intra-euro-area real effective exchange 
rates, which in some cases must have gone 
beyond their longer-term equilibrium values 
(Graph 4).  
Graph 3: Cumulated change in relative real GDP  
(relative to the euro-area average, in %, 1998-2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Graph 4: Cumulated change in relative unit labour cost  
(relative to the euro-area average, in %, 1999-2007) 
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Box 2: Business cycle synchronisation 
The conduct of a single monetary policy in EMU calls for a sufficient degree of business cycle synchronisation of the 
participating economies. The literature on the 'endogeneity of optimum currency areas' predicts that a single currency 
should boost trade integration which, along with financial market integration and the associated cross-country risk 
sharing, leads to more synchronised business cycles. Ten years after the launch of the euro sufficient time has elapsed 
to start examining whether the single currency has indeed led to business cycle synchronisation in the euro area. This 
question can be approached from two angles: by comparing the level of synchronisation in the euro area before and 
after the launch of the single currency or by comparing developments in intra-area and extra-area synchronisation. 
The left-hand panel of the table below compares the mean intra-area correlation of growth in activity in the euro area 
before and after the creation of the euro. The analysis focuses on quarterly GDP and monthly industrial production 
(IP), which are complementary indicators. Given its historically close correlation with GDP and its availability at 
monthly frequency, most studies use the IP. On the other hand, the greater exposure of manufacturing to euro-area-
wide common shocks may be a source of bias towards synchronisation across countries compared to the broader 
GDP measure.  
The results show that the mean correlation of GDP growth between euro-area countries has increased from 0.56 in 
1989-1998 to 0.60 in 1999-2008, although some caution is needed because the last six data points (2007Q3-2008Q4) 
used for the computations were still based on GDP forecasts. As to the IP-based correlations, which end in 2007M7, 
no reliable forecasts were available for the remainder of 2007 and 2008. Therefore the comparisons are based on the 
slightly truncated periods 1999M11-2007M7 and 1989M1-1997M7. However, given the earlier start of the IP data, it 
is possible to go back one more cycle and calculate mean euro-area correlation over the earlier reference period 
starting in mid-1978. The correlation between euro-area countries' IP cycles has risen considerably from the first 
period 1978-1986 (0.48) to the second period 1989-1997 (0.59), and has increased somewhat further to 0.61 in the 
post euro-period 1999-2007.  
So even though correlation results may depend crucially on the chosen periods, the general picture is quite 
unambiguous: cross-country synchronisation in the euro area seems to have risen considerably between the late 
1980s and the late 1990s, pointing to the effects of the internal market programme on trade and financial integration. 
Since the launch of the single currency in 1999, cross-country synchronisation has risen somewhat further, but not 
significantly so. Apparently the effect of lower trade barriers had already largely played itself out. Even so, the 
analysis does not support the view that the common currency might have promoted asymmetries between countries, 
be it through specialisation effects or divergent effects of common monetary impulses.  
The right-hand panel of the table below compares the correlation of quarterly GDP growth between the euro area 
and the US, the UK and Japan in the two ten-year sub-periods before and after the launch of the euro. The euro area 
turns out to be significantly more closely aligned with the US, the UK and Japan since 1999 than during the previous 
ten-year period. Given the already very high level of intra-euro-area synchronisation prior to 1999 and the relatively 
minor further increase thereafter, the gap between intra- and extra-euro-area synchronisation has narrowed 
significantly. The closer euro-area affiliation of the UK is particularly marked, raising its correlation with the currency 
zone from practically zero prior to 1999 to 0.65 thereafter. The US and Japan, on the other hand, are still less 
synchronised with the euro area. The results of the table would therefore point to further 'Europeanisation' , possibly 
related to the internal market programme, rather than synchronisation effects stemming from the introduction of the 
euro. Additional synchronisation effects due to the monetary union's policy coordination framework and its impact 
on structural reforms may well be yet to come. 
 
Mean intra-euro-area correlation in consecutive 
cycles 
Euro-area correlation with outside countries 
(GDP) 
- 1989-1998 1999-2008 GDP 
- 0.56 0.60 
1978-1986 1989-1997 1999-2007 Industrial 
production 0.48 0.59 0.61  
  
EA-
JP 
EA-
UK 
EA-
US Average 
Intra-
EA 
1989-1998 0.46 0.06 -0.18 0.11 0.56 
1999-2008 0.56 0.65 0.35 0.52 0.60  
Sources: Commission services. Sources: Commission services. 
 
This has been reflected in divergent current-
account positions across countries (Graph 5). 
Some, but not all, elements of these differences 
in inflation, growth and external positions can be 
attributed to structural convergence in living 
standards (real convergence). Even so, not all 
inflation differentials are harmful; some are 
merely a sign that competitiveness realignment is 
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doing its job as an instrument of intra-area 
adjustment in the absence of exchange rates.8 
Better functioning labour and product markets 
have helped strengthen this channel (see Box 3) 
while the integration and development of 
financial markets have also helped smooth 
divergences by spreading their impact on broader 
groups of consumers and investors. 
Graph 6: Development of fiscal positions 
(in % of GDP, 1992, 1998 and 2007) 
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Graph 5: Average current account positions  
(in % of GDP, 1999-2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The experience with this policy framework has 
been positive overall. Monetary policy has been 
largely successful in broadly maintaining price 
stability and providing stimulus to activity when 
cyclical conditions were weak and removing 
those stimuli as the economy recovered. 
Notwithstanding recurrent difficulties in 
enforcing the fiscal rules in the early years of 
EMU, the budget deficits have declined 
significantly (Graph 6) – with the euro-area 
average deficit reaching 0.6% of GDP in 2007, 
the lowest level since the early 1970s.  
Source: Commission services. 
4.  Macroeconomic policies 
A positive experience overall 
Less fiscal ease in good times  
As noted, the adoption of the single currency 
implied a radical change in the macroeconomic 
policy framework. Monetary policy was 
henceforth centralised whereas fiscal policy 
remained in the remit of the participating 
countries, albeit subject to rules, surveillance and 
coordination at the EU level. The fiscal rules 
attributed a strong role to automatic fiscal 
stabilisers, which are powerful in the euro area 
owing to the extensive public social safety nets 
and progressive taxes. Meanwhile, fiscal policy 
behaviour should ensure budgets 'close to 
balance or in surplus' over the medium run. The 
Stability and Growth Pact, arguably the core of 
EMU's fiscal framework, was reformed in 2005, 
which reconfirmed and strengthened its 
'corrective arm' after difficulties were 
experienced with its enforcement during the 
economic downturn of 2001-2003. 
Although fiscal policy has continued to be 
somewhat asymmetric, with a pro-cyclical easing 
in 'good times' followed by at best a neutral 
stance in 'bad times', this behaviour has become 
less widespread since the start of EMU than 
previously (see Box 4). Even so, asymmetric 
behaviour remains a matter of concern and the 
mechanisms underlying it appear to be rather 
complex.9 The complicating factor is that fiscal 
policy suffers from long recognition lags 
regarding the actual cyclical position of the 
economy. For example, during the dotcom 
bubble in the early years of EMU, fiscal policy 
                                                     
9  The reduction in the asymmetry of fiscal policy responses 
in EMU was first detected in the seminal paper by Galí, J. 
and R. Perotti (2003), ‘Fiscal policy and monetary 
integration in Europe’, Economic Policy, No. 18(37), 
pp. 533–572. Recent econometric work confirms this, see 
Turrini, A. (2008), ‘Fiscal policy and the cycle in the euro 
area: The role of government revenue and expenditure’, 
European Economy – Economic Papers, No. 323 and Von 
Hagen, J. and Ch. Wyplosz (2008), ‘EMU’s decentralized 
system of fiscal policy’, European Economy – Economic 
Papers, No. 306. 
                                                     
8  See for extensive discussion of intra-area adjustment: 
European Commission (2006), ‘The EU economy: 2006 
Review – Adjustment dynamics in the euro area’, European 
Economy, No. 6. 
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Box 3: Competitiveness as an adjustment mechanism in the euro area 
 
A crucial issue is how sensitive the euro area's internal real effective exchange rates are to the relative cyclical 
positions of the participating countries, whether this has changed with the introduction of the single currency and 
whether structural reform plays an additional role. Econometric tests were carried out for this purpose and comprise 
three steps. 
In a first step, the year-on-year change in the real effective exchange rate (REER) was regressed on its own lag, its 
lagged level and the lagged output gap differential. The first two explanatory variables capture price rigidity and mean 
reversal effects, respectively. The third one measures the short-term price responsiveness to slack or excess demand. 
The regressions are based on annual data and include country fixed effects. A control for differences in income per-
capita (low income countries should exhibit appreciating REERs) appeared insignificant. The results are shown in 
the table below. Separate estimations are reported for the periods 1970-2006 and 1999-2006 to measure the impact 
of the euro. The real exchange rate appears to react positively to differences between the domestic and rest-of-area 
output gap, indicating that competitiveness provides an effective channel of adjustment. The effect is non-negligible: 
an output gap higher (lower) by one percentage point compared with the rest of the euro area implies a REER 
appreciating (depreciating) by about half a percentage point per year. The real exchange rate is stable in the long run, 
owing to the negative and significant coefficient on the lagged REER. However, after 1999 the speed of adjustment 
of real effective exchange rates towards their equilibrium has slowed down with the irrevocable fixing of nominal 
exchange rates. This implies that inflation and output differentials in response to shocks have tended to become 
more persistent. This is obviously not surprising in view of the disappearance of the nominal internal exchange rates. 
 
Real effective exchange rates and cyclical divergence: evidence from panel regressions 
Dependent variable: ΔlogREER 1970 - 2006 1999 – 2006 
Estimation method GLS GMM GLS GMM 
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.205 0.238 -0.054 -0.162 ΔlogREER(-1) 
(4.40)*** (6.72)*** (0.61) (1.58) 
-0.122 -0.162 -0.049 -0.037 logREER(-1) 
(6.20)*** (5.03)*** (2.42)** (1.77)* 
0.667 0.714 0.458 0.556 Relative output gap(-1) 
(6.11)*** (5.87)*** (5.91)*** (9.58)*** 
Observations 385 374 99 99  
Sources: Commission services. 
 
In a second step (see table below) the regression was re-run on the relative GDP deflator (P) instead of the REER, 
while the change in the intra-area nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) was included as an explanatory variable 
(which is obviously zero from 1999 onwards). The purpose is to examine if the responsiveness of the relative GDP 
deflator increased with the launch of the euro. This appears to be the case across two dimensions (less inertia and 
stronger mean reversal), indicating that relative prices have assumed a stronger role in the adjustment. The response 
to the relative output gap is also stronger but the difference is not statistically significant. So, the 'pure' price effect 
(abstracting from the nominal effective exchange rate effect) suggests that the competitiveness channel has become 
stronger since the introduction of the single currency. While encouraging, this greater sensitivity of prices does not 
yet suffice to fully offset the loss of adjustment capacity through the more flexible nominal exchange rates. 
  
'Pure' price competitiveness and cyclical divergence: evidence from panel regressions 
Dependent variable: Δlog P 1970-2006 1999-2006 
Estimation method GLS GMM GLS GMM 
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.626 0.546 0.11 0.182 ΔlogP(-1) 
(20.69)*** (8.62)*** (1.22) (2.18)** 
-0.017 -0.019 -0.063 -0.1 logP(-1) 
(7.54)*** (2.87)*** (3.01)*** (2.78)*** 
0.265 0.222 0.386 0.358 Rel. output gap(-1) 
(5.53)*** (3.23)*** (4.92)*** (5.65)*** 
-0.093 -0.094   ΔlogNEER(-1) 
(4.57)*** (2.75)***   
Observations 385 374 99 88  
Sources: Commission services. 
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In a third step the impact of product and labour market institutions on the effectiveness of the competitiveness 
channel was examined. For this purpose the regressions reported in the table above were re-run with the 
responsiveness of the countries' relative inflation rates to their relative output gap and to their own relative inflation 
records allowed to vary according to their relative scores on measures of product and labour market institutions by 
introducing interactions terms in the equations. The indicators are taken from OECD structural reform databases 
and the results are reported in the table below. Tight product market regulation appears to raise the persistence of 
relative inflation when the relative output gap is negative and so does strict employment protection. A high 
minimum wage and high union density reduce the short-run responsiveness to relative slack, i.e. lead to more price 
rigidity if the relative output gap is negative. High unemployment benefits lead to more price rigidity persistence in 
both directions, i.e. both when the economy is comparatively buoyant and when it is comparatively sluggish. 
 
Competitiveness, adjustment, and labour and product market institutions 
Dependent variable: 
Δlog P Interaction with: 1970 -2006 1999-2006 
Relative output 
gap<0 
Explanatory variables:     
Relative output gap(-1) Overall Product Market Regulation Indicator    
 Price Control neg** neg**  
 Employment Protection Legislation neg** neg*  
 Minimum wage   neg** 
 Union Density   pos*** neg*** 
 Unemployment Benefits Replacement Rate   neg***   
 High Corporatism    
 Intermediate Corporatism    
 Low Corporatism pos***   
ΔlogP(-1) Overall Product Market Regulation Indicator  neg** pos* 
 Price Control  neg*** pos** 
 Employment Protection Legislation pos***  pos*** 
 Minimum wage pos***     
 Union Density     neg* 
 Unemployment Benefits Replacement Rate   pos***   
 High Corporatism neg**   neg* 
 Intermediate Corporatism pos**   pos** 
 Low Corporatism    neg*** 
Notes: The table reports the sign and significance of the interaction of structural indicators with the relative output gap and the persistence
variable using the same specification as in columns (2) of the previous table (GMM estimate) 
Sources: Commission services. 
 
was still responding to recession fears in the 
wake of the Asian crisis. It thus failed to stem the 
upswing and – despite extremely favourable 
conditions – to consolidate budgets. In the 
subsequent downturn fiscal policy was eased on 
the back of windfall gains stemming from the 
dotcom boom and a busy electoral agenda, and 
while with hindsight this looks like a 
countercyclical response to weakening activity, in 
reality this was largely unintentional.10 In the 
event fiscal positions deteriorated and this led to 
breaches of the 3% of GDP deficit ceiling in 
some countries and difficulties in enforcing the 
SGP, and a painful consolidation ensued. After 
its 2005 reform, member countries reasserted 
their ownership of the SGP and enforcement has 
since considerably improved. 
                                                     
10 See Buti, M. and P. van den Noord (2004), 'Fiscal 
discretion and elections in the early years of EMU', Journal 
of Common Market Studies, Vol. 42, pp.737-756.  
A balanced policy mix 
The early debates highlighted the risk of 
unbalanced policy mixes, with participating 
countries' fiscal policies working against, rather 
than supporting, monetary policy. In theory a 
succession of unbalanced policy mixes, already 
undesirable on its own account, also risks 
triggering volatile movements in the external 
value of the currency – with strong appreciations 
during upswings if monetary policy tightening is 
not supported by fiscal restraint. These fears 
have in fact proved to be largely unfounded, with 
fiscal and monetary policies supporting each 
other, aside from a short spell of pro-cyclical 
fiscal policies during the dotcom boom in 1999-
2000 (Graph 7). 
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greater flexibility of its economy, with prices and 
wages responding more strongly to slack, thus 
creating more leeway for monetary policy to 
provide stimulus in a downturn (and vice versa in 
an upturn). The question may, however, 
legitimately be asked if these greater interest rate 
fluctuations orchestrated by the Fed explain the 
extent of the housing boom and bust in the US.  
Graph 7: Fiscal-monetary policy mix in the euro area 
(in pp, 1999 to 2008) (1) 
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Graph 8: Fiscal-monetary policy mix in the US 
(in pp, 1999 to 2008) (1) 
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(1) 2008 - forecast values.  
Source: Commission services.  
 
A striking feature of macroeconomic policies in 
the euro area, compared to the US, is that they 
have been less responsive to the cycle. As 
becomes evident from inspecting Graph 8, both 
the fiscal and the monetary stance produced 
markedly smaller impulses to aggregate demand 
than on the other side of the Atlantic. There are 
several explanations for the different degrees of 
policy activism observed.  
(1) 2008 - forecast values. 
Source: Commission services.  
5.  Market functioning First, the more aggressive easing of 
macroeconomic policies in the US in the early 
2000s was partly justified by a much sharper 
deterioration in the output gap in the early stages 
of the downturn than in the euro area. More 
generally, while stronger policy activism in the 
US may be motivated by more pronounced 
cyclical swings in economic activity, those swings 
may in fact be partly caused by it. 
A boost to financial market integration  
There is strong evidence that the creation of the 
single currency has spurred the integration of 
financial markets in the euro area. This has 
supported the financial sector’s adjustment role 
in several ways: by encouraging the movement of 
cross-border capital towards its best uses; by 
diminishing the risk of local credit crunches; and 
by promoting risk diversification and associated 
cyclical smoothing.  
Second, greater fiscal activism in the US must 
also been seen against the background of an 
economy in which automatic stabilisers play a 
comparatively smaller role.11 Furthermore, 
budgetary policy making in the euro area is 
constrained by the provisions of the SGP, which 
puts clear restrictions on discretionary measures. 
This is rooted in a growing scepticism about the 
effectiveness of discretionary fiscal policy making 
and an increasing tendency to rely on automatic 
fiscal stabilisers.  
The most immediate and extensive impact of 
EMU on financial integration has been felt on 
the euro-area markets for unsecured money and 
derivatives. Almost as soon as EMU was 
launched, interest rates on inter-bank deposits 
and derivative contracts across the euro area 
converged fully on the benchmark Euribor and 
Eonia rates (Graph 9). 
Third, as regards the monetary policy stance, the 
stronger activism in the US may reflect the  
                                                     
11  See also discussion in European Commission (2007), ibid, 
p 36-37.  
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Box 4: Assessing the fiscal stance in the euro area to date 
The first ten years of EMU roughly coincide with a full business cycle, consisting of three phases, 'boom' (or 'good 
times'), 'downturn' and 'recovery'. A boom is defined here as an episode in which the output gap is positive and 
increasing. A downturn is an episode in which the gap is falling and turning negative and a recovery is an episode in 
which the negative gap is closing. There is a strong resemblance between the latest cycle (1999-08) and its 
predecessor which also spanned ten years (1989-1998) and portrayed a similar time profile for the output gap. 
Virtually all euro-area countries followed similar cyclical patterns, with output gaps positive and expanding in the 
booms of 1989- 1990 and 1999-2000, contracting (and turning negative) in the downturns of 1991-1993 and 2001-
2003 and then closing again in the recoveries of 1994-1998 and 2004-2008. 
 
For the assessment of the stance of fiscal policy it is important to consider also the output gaps in real time. It 
suggests a much smaller variation of the level and changes of the output gap, a phenomenon that is common to 
virtually all euro-area countries. Apparently, most countries failed to perceive the relatively volatile swings going on 
at the time. More specifically, many countries did not recognise the positive values and saw smaller increases of the 
output gap in 1999-2000, and they were also largely unaware of the extent of the 2001-2003 downturn. 
 
Fiscal policy stance in the euro area: real time and expost, 1996-2007 
  Boom  Downturn Recovery 
  1999-2000 2001-2003 2004-2008 
  Real time Ex post Real time Ex post Real time Ex post 
Austria - - - - + + 
Belgium - + + - + + 
Germany - - + + - - 
Greece + - + + + - 
Spain - + - - - - 
Finland - - + + - - 
France - + + + - - 
Ireland - - + + - - 
Italy - + + + + - 
Luxembourg + - + + - + 
Netherlands - - + + - - 
Portugal + + + - + - 
Euro area - + + + - - 
Note: "-" stands for contractionary fiscal policy; "+" for expansionary fiscal policy. Pro-cyclical episodes are in bold. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
The issue then becomes how fiscal policy, as gauged by the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance as a 
share of GDP, behaved during the cycle, both in real time and ex post. Differences between the two largely reflect 
the assessment of the output gaps as revisions in the nominal budget numbers themselves have been comparatively 
minor. Looking at the record in more detail (see graph below), the following can be inferred: 
• In the 1999-2000 boom procyclicality was not very widespread, although on aggregate the stance was slightly 
stimulatory. This does not compare unfavourably with the boom of 1989-1990, when fiscal policy was clearly 
eased in a procyclical manner in the vast majority of countries – with the notable exceptions of Italy and 
Belgium where high debt levels and an associated surge in debt servicing forced fiscal consolidation upon them. 
However, the quasi-neutrality observed ex post was not in most countries' ex ante plans, with the real time 
measure suggesting that on average the fiscal stance was tightening – i.e. was counter-cyclical. This reflects the 
underestimation of the extent of the boom and hence the cyclical component of fiscal gains: the perceived fiscal 
tightening in reality reflected the response of the automatic stabilisers to the ongoing upswing.  
• In the 2001-2003 downturn the fiscal stance can be seen with hindsight to have been stimulatory in most 
countries (except for Spain, Portugal and Austria) – i.e. it was counter-cyclical. This may have been motivated by 
stabilisation considerations, but it is more likely to have been driven by the mechanism described above: 
governments were responding as if there had been a structural improvement in the fiscal position and were 
spending the windfall gains. This tendency may have been reinforced by the one-off proceeds of the UMTS 
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licence sales in some countries and the unusually busy electoral calendar at the time – notably in the larger 
countries. The ex ante stance also suggests counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus in this episode, but again this was 
probably accidental. It is in contrast with the 1991-1993 downturns when many countries tightened their 
budgets, possibly in response to sustainability concerns and financial market turbulence.  
 
• In the 2004-2008 recovery governments were forced to correct the past excesses, with several countries having 
had to face Excessive Deficit Procedures. The fiscal tightening eventually leaned against the wind of the 
recovery, but this was prompted more by the fiscal consolidation needs imposed by the SGP than by a desire to 
choke off the upswing. This drive to consolidate budgets is confirmed by the real time measure, which also 
indicates a tightening fiscal policy stance. This behaviour is quite similar to the previous cycle, when fiscal policy 
was tightened in the recovery phase in a vast majority of countries (France is a notable exception). This reflected 
the measures taken to qualify for euro adoption subsequent to the Maastricht Treaty. Electoral considerations 
may have played a role as well: qualifying for the single currency was seen to raise the odds of re-election, 
whereas in normal circumstances governments tend rather to ease fiscal policy during election campaigns. 
 
Graph 9: 3-month interbank rates 
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Source: Commission services. 
EMU also had a very substantial impact on the 
integration of the market for government bonds, 
which are important not only as a source of 
government financing but also in providing 
reference pricing for other financial instruments. 
Well ahead of the launch of EMU, there was a 
process of sustained convergence in yields on 
bonds issued by the euro-area Member States 
(Graph 10).  
The availability of an integrated cash market for 
government bonds in the euro area has spurred 
the development of markets for other related 
asset classes, such as corporate bonds, covered 
bonds, asset-backed securities and a range of 
derivative instruments. While the amount of 
gross issuance of government bonds in the euro 
area has not changed significantly since 1999, 
issuance of these non-government bonds has 
expanded significantly over the period. Empirical 
analysis suggests that the expansion in these 
market segments can be attributed to a range of 
economic and technical factors but the euro is 
found to have affected corporate-bond issuance 
both directly through the elimination of currency 
risk and more indirectly via higher financing 
needs due to euro-related corporate 
restructuring.12
The impact of EMU on the integration of equity 
markets has been less pronounced than in other 
asset markets but there is some indication that 
equity-market integration has proceeded faster in 
the euro area than at the global level, particularly 
since the introduction of the euro. Integration of 
financial market infrastructure has also advanced. 
Progress has been made in cross-border 
wholesale financial services, while the Single 
Euro Payments Area (SEPA) is set to eliminate 
differences between national and cross-border 
retail payments. 
Graph 10: 10-year government bond yields 
(in %, 1990-2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
                                                     
12 See for instance ECB (2004), 'The euro bond market 
study', European Central Bank (December).  
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/eurobondmarketstu
dy2004en.pdf
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However, financial integration remains work in 
progress. While it has progressed substantially 
since (and partly owing to) the introduction of 
the euro, several markets are still fragmented and 
the pace of integration varies from one country 
to another. For instance, secured money markets 
– including the markets for T-bills, commercial 
paper and certificates of deposit, as well as the 
private repo market – have remained more 
segmented along national borders due to national 
differences in legal and tax frameworks and 
continued fragmentation in national clearing and 
settlement infrastructures. Cross-border 
provision of retail financial services is also 
lagging and regulatory and supervisory costs for 
financial intermediaries operating in a multi-
jurisdictional environment remain high. As well, 
the cross-border cooperation in arrangements for 
crisis prevention, management and resolution 
should be stepped up as financial integration 
proceeds.  
The remaining fragmentation represents an 
opportunity cost for the euro-area economy, 
which needs a high degree of financial integration 
not only to raise productive potential but also to 
improve its capacity to adjust to country-specific 
shocks.  
Little evidence of 'TINA' effects  
The single currency was expected by some to 
spur governments to undertake structural reform, 
as this was seen as the only way to enhance the 
market-based adjustment capacity so as to offset 
the loss of the exchange rate instrument of intra-
area adjustment – this is the so-called There-Is-
No-Alternative (TINA) hypothesis.13 Others, 
however, argued that the disappearance of the 
exchange rate risk by improving market 
competition would rather lead to demand for 
more protectionism and hence weaken the 
incentives for structural reform.14 The evidence 
is not very conclusive, but it is clear that on 
balance the single currency has had little positive 
effect on the pace of structural reform, which 
                                                     
13 See for example, Bean, C. (1998), ‘The interaction of 
aggregate-demand policies and labour market reform’, 
Swedish Economic Policy Review, Vol. 5, pp. 353–382. 
14 See for example, Calmfors, L. (2001), ‘Unemployment, 
labour market reform and monetary union’, Journal of 
Labor Economics, No. 19(2), pp. 265–289. 
invalidates the TINA hypothesis.15 Consistent 
with these findings, the analysis reported in 
Box 5 indicates that euro-area countries have on 
average been less forthcoming in implementing 
the structural policy recommendations made to 
them by the EU under the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) – a Treaty-based tool 
for economic policy coordination – in the period 
2000-2005. In particular, progress in the cross-
border integration of services has been more 
muted than expected, which is particularly 
problematic.16 It is in this area especially that 
price rigidities persist. This has been recognised 
by the European authorities, such as the 
Eurogroup and the European Commission, 
which in turn has led to intensified surveillance 
of national structural policies in the euro area in 
the framework of the Lisbon Strategy for 
Growth and Jobs, which was revamped in 2005. 
6.  The international role of the euro area 
At the outset there was a consensus that the euro 
would be well received internationally but would 
not match the US dollar's dominant position. In 
practice, the euro quickly emerged as the second 
most important international currency alongside 
the US dollar and continues to consolidate this 
position. The euro has become a prominent 
currency of denomination in international debt 
markets and its role as an invoicing and reserve 
currency has been growing as well (Graph 11). It 
plays an important role as an anchor or reference 
currency in the managed exchange rate regimes 
of about 40 countries. Even so, the US dollar 
remains the first global currency in many areas, in 
part due to incumbency effects, and the euro's 
international role remains relatively concentrated 
in the regions neighbouring the euro area. This 
suggests that there is considerable scope for the  
15 Duval, R. and J. Elmeskov (2006), ‘The effects of EMU 
on structural reforms in labour and product markets’, 
ECB Working Paper Series, No. 596, March, see no 
acceleration of reforms in EMU. A slowdown in reforms 
in 1999-2004 relative to 1994-1998 is reported by Duval, 
R. (2005), ‘Fiscal positions, fiscal adjustment and 
structural reforms in labour and product markets’, in 
Deroose, S, E. Flores, and A. Turrini (eds.) (2005), 
'Budgetary implications of structural reforms', European 
Economy – Economic Papers, No. 248. 
16 A large part of the better productivity performance 
registered in the US relative to the euro area since the 
1990s may be traced back to service sectors. See Havik, 
K., K. McMorrow, W. Röger and A. Turrini (2008), ibid. 
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Box 5: The impact of the euro on structural reform 
From the economic literature emerges the picture that being in or out of the euro area, or the launch of the single 
currency itself, has not been a stimulus for structural reform – which is a concern in view of the euro area's stronger 
reform needs than those of the wider EU. It appears therefore useful to crosscheck this finding with an alternative 
set of reform indicators. The approach chosen is to analyse whether euro-area countries have fared better or worse 
than non-euro-area countries in terms of respecting the recommendations addressed to them by the EU under the 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) – a Treaty-based tool for policy coordination.  
Since 2000, the BEPGs have provided the basis for the European Council, upon proposal by the European 
Commission, to issue recommendations for economic reform in the EU countries. Every year the European 
Commission has assessed progress in the Member countries with the implementation of policies to address these 
recommendations. Though the assessment is mainly qualitative, progress with each recommendation has been 
classified in four categories (3 = complete, 2 = in progress/partial, 1 = limited, 0 = none). Scores are computed in 
the policy areas of product markets (including knowledge-economy reforms) and labour markets (including reforms 
of social security and pensions). The data set comprises the period 2000-2005, with annual recommendations and 
implementation reports available from 2000 to 2002 and multi-annual recommendations available for the 2003-2005 
period. The analysis hence does not cover the period since the re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, when the 
later was revised significantly. This yields four observations per country and 60 in total (see table below).  
 
Recommendations and implementation scores in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 2000-2005 
 EA12 Non-EA control group 
(DK, SE, UK) 
Top 3 EA performers Standard 
deviation EU15 
Number of 
recommendations 22.8 15 14.3 6.7 
- Labour market 10.3 5.3 4.3 4.5 
- Product market 12.4 9.7 10.0 2.6 
Implementation score (1) 1.4 1.7 1.6 0.2 
- Labour market 1.3 1.7 1.5 0.3 
- Product market 1.4 1.6 1.6 0.2  
(1) score encompasses 0 (no measures) via 1 (partial, limited), 2 (in progress) and 3 (complete) 
Sources: Commission services. 
  
The table compares the average scores of the 12 euro-area Member States with those of the UK, Denmark and 
Sweden, which have remained outside the euro area. Over the period reviewed, there were more recommendations 
addressed to the average euro-area Member State than to the average other country, suggesting that euro-area 
Member States were considered to have grater reform needs. No systematic difference emerges for the three out-
countries in comparison with the three best countries in the euro area in terms of number of recommendations 
issued. Differences in the follow up to the recommendations between euro-area and non-euro-area countries are 
shown in the lower panel of the table. The average score for all euro-area countries was about one standard deviation 
worse than for the three out countries. Moreover, the score in each of the three out countries is higher than the 
euro-area average, although again the three best performers in the euro area had only a slightly smaller score than the 
three out countries.  
While the latter findings point to a negative impact of euro-area Membership on the structural reform efforts, it is 
entirely possible that this effect is driven by a negative correlation between the number of recommendations and the 
policy effort devoted to each recommendation. Such a negative correlation is plausible: if governments have limited 
political capital and administrative capacity to reform, their average achievement will decline with the number of 
targets. The estimates in the table below show, however, that the correlation of structural reform with membership 
of the euro area remains negative even if controls are introduced for the number of recommendations and the size of 
the economy. It needs to be borne in mind that, as noted, the analysis does not cover the period since the re-launch 
of the Lisbon Strategy. The Commission concluded in its recent Strategic Report of December 2007 that 
considerable progress had been made since the re-launch of the Lisbon strategy in 2005, with visible progress on 
reforms in key priority areas. 
The result reported in the table also suggests that the size of the economy has a positive impact on reform scores, 
which seems to contradict the widely held belief that small countries in the euro area are more active reformers. 
However, further analysis suggests that the significance of the positive coefficient is attributable to the relatively low 
scores in the assessment for two of the smallest Member States in the sample, Ireland and Luxembourg.  
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Determinants of structural reform scores based on BEPGs 
 Constant No Size EMU 
1.56 -0.02 0.07 -0.20 
(0.16)*** (0.005)*** (0.02)*** (0.08)** 1. Average 2000-2003/05 
R2 = 0.76 Obs. = 15   
1.46 -0.07 0.09 -0.20 
(0.25)*** (0.03)** (0.04)** (0.12) 2. Individual years 
R2 = 0.23 Obs. = 60     
1.43 -0.05 0.08 -0.22 
(0.22)*** (0.03)** (0.03)** (0.11)** 3. Individual years with year fixed effects 
R2 = 0.42 Obs. = 60    
Note: No - Number of recommendations, size - in(GDP in PPS, average 1999-2005), EMU - dummy for EMU Member States, OLS estimate, 
standard errors in brackets, *,**,*** significance at 10, 5, 1% level, respectively. 
Sources: Commission services. 
 
 
euro to continue expanding its role as a global 
currency. 
Graph 11: Currency shares in foreign exchange reserves 
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Despite the growing global role of the euro and 
the fact that the euro area has become a pole of 
stability in the global economy, attempts to 
improve the external representation of the euro 
area on financial and monetary matters have not 
made much progress. More generally, Europe's 
external representation in international financial 
fora – such as the Bretton Woods institutions – 
remains fragmented, reducing the actual 
influence of the euro area despite the large 
number of seats that EU (and euro-area) 
countries hold in them. However, some progress 
was recently made with the euro area being 
represented at the meetings held in the context 
of the IMF-led multilateral consultations on 
global imbalances. Bilateral dialogues are held 
with strategic partners, but this involves the EU 
as a whole rather than the euro area as an entity 
in its own right – with one exception being the 
dialogue with China (where the Presidents of the 
ECB and the Eurogroup are involved together 
with the Commissioner for Economic and 
Financial Affairs). 
7.  Governance of the euro area 
The economic governance structure of the euro 
area builds on a combination of 'subsidiarity' – 
which leaves policy responsibilities to the 
participating countries wherever possible – and 
various forms of policy coordination. The view 
underlying the Maastricht Treaty was that – aside 
from centralised monetary policy – coordination 
in EMU should mainly take place within a rules-
based framework to ensure fiscal stability, thus, 
limiting the room for policy actions entailing 
negative spillovers to the rest of the euro area. 
Softer forms of coordination aimed at fostering 
'good' behaviour have nevertheless become part 
and parcel of the EU governance structure, 
notably with the growing role of the Lisbon 
Strategy. 
The governance structure of the euro area has 
helped promote a common understanding 
among euro-area policy makers of the 
importance of sound public finances and flexible 
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product, labour and capital markets for the 
smooth functioning of EMU. As such it has 
contributed to deliver macroeconomic stability in 
many dimensions: low and stable inflation, 
greater resilience to adverse shocks, major 
efficiency gains associated with strong integration 
in financial and product markets, and better fiscal 
behaviour. Even so, EMU’s governance 
arrangements have at times suffered from a 
deficit of political and national ownership, with 
some Member States reluctant to translate a 
common understanding of policy challenges into 
policy-making at home. Decisive steps to 
improve this situation were taken in 2005, 
notably a reform of the Stability and Growth 
Pact, the revamping of the Lisbon Strategy for 
Growth and Jobs, and the appointment of a 
President of the Eurogroup – the informal 
gathering of euro-area Finance Ministers that 
traditionally precedes the meetings of the Council 
of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) 
– for a term of two years. 
The Eurogroup has been charged with growing 
responsibility for the economic governance of 
the euro area, particularly since the appointment 
of its permanent President in January 2005. Over 
the last decade the Eurogroup's most important 
achievement has been to foster a common 
understanding among Finance Ministers of the 
principal policy challenges facing the euro area. 
The Eurogroup's proactive role in brokering a 
deal on revising the Stability and Growth Pact in 
March 2005 is clear evidence of its increasing 
importance in the euro-area's coordination 
process. 
Improving fiscal governance 
The dissuasive effect of the fiscal governance set-
up embodied in the Stability and Growth Pact 
initially turned out not to be as effective as 
anticipated – even if the situation had clearly 
improved in comparison with earlier decades. 
Underlying budgetary imbalances were still built 
up during good times even if not to the same 
extent as previously. There were sizeable 
deviations from agreed adjustment paths of the 
fiscal position (Graph 12) and attempts to 
comply with the 3% of GDP reference value for 
budget deficits in some cases led to only 
cosmetic improvements.17 In March 2005 a 
reform of the Stability and Growth Pact was 
adopted by the ECOFIN Council. Concerning 
the 'preventive arm' of the Pact it introduced a 
focus on structural balances and the possibility of 
adopting medium-term budgetary objectives that 
were better tailored to a country’s specific 
circumstances, while allowing some flexibility in 
the pace at which this objective should be 
achieved, depending on a country's structural 
reform efforts (notably pension reform). In the 
'corrective arm', the economic circumstances that 
could lead to a waiver of the excessive deficit 
procedure were reinterpreted and clarified. In 
addition, some flexibility was also introduced 
regarding the length of the adjustment period, 
inter alia to take into account possible adverse 
economic events with major unfavourable 
consequences for government finances. The 
implementation of the corrective arm now runs 
more smoothly, although further progress 
concerning the preventive arm would be 
warranted. 
Other governance issues 
Structural reform has remained largely within the 
remit of the Member States, but the need for 
enhanced structural reforms in the euro area was 
widely accepted from the outset. Article 99 of the 
EC Treaty requires all EU Member States to 
'regard their economic policies as a matter of 
common concern and shall coordinate them 
within the Council'. The importance of structural 
reform for the functioning of the euro area has 
led to including references to the euro-area 
dimension in the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines (BEPGs) to which the Treaty has 
assigned a central role in the coordination of 
economic policies. Importantly, the BEPGs now 
help to internalise euro-area priorities – notably 
the need for flexible and effective adjustment of 
prices and wages in the absence of internal 
exchange rates – into Member States' reform 
17 See for reviews of the use of, respectively, stock-flow 
adjustment and other fiscal gimmicks and their incentives: 
Buti, M., J. Nogueira Martins and A. Turrini (2007), 
'From deficits to debt and back: political incentives under 
numerical fiscal rules', CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 53, pp. 
115-152, and Koen, V. and P. van den Noord (2006), 
‘Fiscal gimmickry in Europe: One-off measures and 
creative accounting’, in P. Wierts, S. Deroose, E. Flores 
and A. Turrini (eds): Fiscal policy surveillance in Europe, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan. 
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priorities. However, as discussed further in Part 
II of this report (see Section 'Reaping the 
benefits of coordination'), with the current 
system of governance in EMU, the full potential 
benefits of the coordination of Member States' 
structural reforms have not been exploited.  
Graph 12: Slipping fiscal targets (1) 
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(1) General government budget balances (excluding UMTS, % of 
GDP) as projected in Stability Programmes (SPs) 
Source: Commission services. 
Another important area of EMU governance 
concerns the conduct of exchange rate policy, for 
which the Council and the Eurosystem share 
responsibility. Formal or informal agreements on 
exchange rates with partners outside the euro 
area require a decision by the Council. The 
Eurosystem (the system of euro-area National 
Central Banks and the ECB) holds the euro-
area's foreign exchange reserves and has sole 
responsibility for exchange rate intervention. In 
practice the conduct of exchange rate policy has 
not encountered major problems. However, the 
views of Ministers in the Eurogroup do not 
always converge and this has occasionally led to 
inconsistencies in public statements. The 2005 
decision to appoint the Eurogroup President for 
a term of two years and his expanded 
participation in G7 meetings along with the use 
of terms of reference on this topic has improved 
the situation in this regard.18
Finally, the proper functioning of EMU requires 
a comprehensive information system to provide 
the statistical data on which to base surveillance, 
coordination and policy decisions. An action plan 
                                                     
18  Terms of reference summarise Ministers’ understanding 
of particular issues and the implications for economic 
policy.  
on EMU statistics was endorsed by the ECOFIN 
Council in September 2000 which identified the 
statistical areas where progress was urgent. This 
boosted the development of high-frequency 
statistics, although more could be done to 
increase the timeliness and scope of EMU 
statistics. 
8.  Concluding remarks 
The launch of the euro represented a sea change 
in the macroeconomic environment of its 
participating Member States. A single monetary 
policy combined with national but coordinated 
fiscal policies has fostered macroeconomic 
stability. The European Central Bank (ECB) 
quickly established and has maintained its 
credibility. The intra-European exchange rate 
tensions that periodically traumatised the 
European economies have become a thing of the 
past. Budgetary discipline has improved 
significantly, strengthened by the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). The euro-area economy has 
pursued a faster track of economic and financial 
integration than the rest of the EU and its 
resilience in the face of external shocks has 
become stronger. Progress has been made on 
many fronts.  
However, not all expectations have been fulfilled: 
• At around 2% per annum, potential growth 
remains too low. Although employment has 
soared, and despite the positive impact of the 
single currency, productivity growth has 
been slow and the euro area's per capita 
income has stalled at 70% of that of the 
United States.  
• There have been substantial and lasting 
differences across countries in terms of 
inflation and unit labour costs. This has led 
to accumulated competitiveness gains/losses 
and large external imbalances, which in EMU 
require long periods of adjustment. 
Essentially, this protracted adjustment 
reflects the fact that structural reforms have 
been less ambitious since the launch of the 
euro than in the run-up to it.  
• As an international currency the euro is a 
major asset for all euro-area members and 
for the EU as a whole. In the present 
turbulent global economic environment, the 
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single currency provides a shield and can put 
the euro area in a unique position to play a 
key role in the global political arena in 
shaping globalisation. However this potential 
is not sufficiently exploited as the euro area 
has neither a properly defined international 
strategy nor effective international 
representation.  
• While the Eurogroup has improved its 
functioning over the last decade through 
learning by doing, it has not yet emerged as a 
body that actively guides, coordinates and 
takes real leadership on matters that, 
although not always unique to the euro area, 
are of particular importance for euro-area 
members. In particular, the Eurogroup has 
not yet been able to systematically turn 
common understanding among euro-area 
Finance Ministers into concerted policy 
action, most notably in the area of structural 
reforms.  
• Finally, the public image of the euro does 
not fully reflect EMU's successful economic 
performance. The euro is often used as a 
scapegoat for poor economic performances 
that in reality result from inappropriate 
economic policies at the national level. 
Furthermore citizens in some countries 
believe that prices have significantly 
increased because of the euro.  
Clearly, important work still lies ahead. But 
beyond the fulfilment of initial expectations, the 
EMU policy agenda for the next decade will be 
marked by the emergence of new global 
challenges which will amplify the weaknesses of 
EMU outlined above. This is the topic of the 
next part section in this issue. 
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II. Challenges ahead 
In spite of an overall positive assessment of its first 10 years, EMU now faces new challenges that were not fully apparent 
when it was devised. Globalisation is progressing apace and natural resources are increasingly scarce. Changing terms of trade 
on world markets and the unwinding of global imbalances could have highly asymmetric effects on the economies of the 
Member States. The progressive enlargement of the euro area will also make economic structures increasingly diverse within it. 
These developments will require a high degree of resilience from euro-are economies and an efficient intra-area adjustment 
capacity. Climate change and the effects of population ageing will put additional strains on the capacity of the euro-area 
economy to grow. Promoting growth and employment, ensuring efficient intra-area adjustment, enlarging the euro area 
smoothly, and successfully meeting the area's increased responsibilities in global macro-financial governance, are key priorities 
for the coming years. The extent to which these objectives will be achieved will depend on the capacity of euro-area members to 
build a common understanding on the issues ahead and to implement adequate responses both at national and euro-area/EU 
level.  
1.  A changing world landscape 
Global trends ahead 
Looking ahead, the global landscape looks 
different now from how it did at the launch of 
EMU.  
Globalisation has been progressing apace. 
Emerging economies have become a powerful 
engine of growth and current projections indicate 
that their role in the world economy will increase 
still further (Graph 13). Financial markets are 
becoming increasingly integrated, with cross-
border financial flows outpacing trade flows and 
financial markets in the emerging world gaining 
global importance. Meanwhile, the export-driven 
growth strategies in emerging economies along 
with dissaving in the United States have 
contributed to the build-up of global current 
account imbalances. The risk of a disorderly 
unwinding of these imbalances has been lurking 
for some time and while the downturn in the US 
and the recent depreciation of the dollar go some 
way towards easing the pressure, they continue to 
pose a threat for the stability of the world 
economy.  
The growing scarcity of natural resources and 
climate change may become more acute and act 
as a constraint on non-inflationary growth in the 
developed world. The possible end of the 
disinflation pressures brought by the integration 
of China's and India's labour force into the global 
economy and substantial changes in relative 
prices caused by climate change and tensions on 
na tura l  r esources  marke t s  –  which  a re 
manifesting themselves in temporarily higher 
inflation – are likely to present an increasingly 
stiff challenge to monetary policies. Moreover, 
this not only makes a strong call on the capacity  
Graph 13: World GDP in 2005 and 2050  
(2005 USD and relative prices) 
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Source: Poncet, S. (2005), The long-term growth prospects of the 
world economy: Horizon 2050', CEPII Working Paper 2006/16. 
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of economies to adjust, it is also a concern in 
terms of the adverse income redistribution 
effects that stem from commodity price inflation 
– which come on top of the redistribution effects 
of globalisation combined with technological 
developments, via a shift in labour demand away 
from low-skilled work.  
Graph 14: Age-related expenditure in the euro area  
(in % of GDP, 2004-2050) 
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The rapid ageing of populations is bound to 
leave its mark on the growth potential and public 
finances of the advanced economies. It calls for 
policies to reinvigorate labour market 
participation, raise labour productivity and 
strengthen fiscal governance. The lower 
adaptability of an ageing population will make 
adjustment to shocks more difficult. Upward 
pressure on age-related expenditures (Graph 14) 
and consequently on public finance positions, 
reinforces the need to keep fiscal policies in 
check and maintain a focus on the longer-term 
sustainability of public finances. 
Implications for the euro area  
These global trends will pose challenges for the 
performance of all advanced economies in terms 
of growth, inflation, macroeconomic stability, 
adjustment capacity, the sustainability of social 
security systems and the distribution of income 
and wealth. Euro-area countries are well-
equipped to adapt to a globalising world. 
European trade integration and monetary 
unification were major leaps forward towards 
globalisation and the perception that past 
challenges were successfully dealt with provides 
comfort for the future. Euro-area economies 
have long been relatively open economies not 
only towards other euro-area and EU countries 
but also towards other advanced, emerging and 
developing trade partners. Euro-area 
participation also offers a clear advantage in 
terms of stable macroeconomic conditions. 
However, in several respects, the ongoing global 
trends produce a number of policy challenges 
that are even more compelling for – if not unique 
to – the euro area. 
First, the euro area has limited natural resources, 
and is rapidly ageing while public indebtedness is 
high. Therefore, many euro-area countries tend 
to be more exposed and less equipped to 
respond to ongoing trends which have 
implications for potential growth. A new impetus 
for structural reform, building on the Lisbon 
Strategy for Growth and Jobs, is a priority in the 
EU as a whole, but an absolute necessity in the 
euro area, since the lack of efficient markets 
affects not only the growth potential but also the 
adjustment capacity of euro-area countries.  
Second, from the outset the occurrence of 
country-specific demand shocks was seen to be a 
major concern for EMU in the absence of 
internal exchange rates. They proved to be less of 
a concern in the first ten years, partly because 
macroeconomic stability at the national level 
improved with the adoption of the single 
currency, and partly also because the global 
macroeconomic environment has been relatively 
benign.19 Going forward, while country-specific 
shocks are less of a concern than feared before 
the inception of EMU, notably due to reduced 
risks of idiosyncratic fiscal shocks, the global 
environment is set to become more challenging 
for intra-area adjustment, since exchange rate and 
terms of trade shocks, are likely to become more 
prominent. These common shocks affect 
participating countries differently due to 
differences in exposure to trade, raw materials 
and finance (see Box 6).  
Third, the relatively greater prominence of 
adverse supply shocks heightens the risk of 
conflicts between fiscal policies and monetary 
policy. The strong counter-cyclicality of interest  
                                                     
19 It has been shown that reduced volatility of fiscal positions is 
associated with more synchronised output (Darvas, Z., A. Rose 
and G. Szapáry (2005), ‘Fiscal divergence and business cycle 
synchronization: Irresponsibility is idiosyncratic’, NBER Working 
Papers, No. 11580).  
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Box 6: Asymmetric effects of common external shocks 
 
The direct exposure of the euro area to extra-euro area trade is only about 17% of GDP but the diversity across 
Member States is large, which implies that common shocks may have important cross-country repercussions. This is 
illustrated with simulations with a multi-region version of the two-sector (tradables and non-tradables) QUEST 
model (European Commission 2006). Simulations are run for three representative countries: Germany, Italy and 
Ireland. Germany has a trade exposure to the rest of the world in line with the euro-area average, while Italy has a 
specialisation pattern biased towards more 'traditional' sectors and is more exposed to competition from emerging 
markets. Ireland has an above-average degree of openness and a high trade exposure to the rest of the world. 
A negative shock to US private demand (both private consumption and investment are assumed to fall by 1%) leads 
to a reduction in US import demand and exports in euro-area countries. Under flexible exchange rates, a more 
exposed country like Ireland would have depreciated vis-à-vis other less exposed European countries. However, in 
the euro area, more exposed countries only depreciate in real effective terms and this requires a stronger relative 
drop in GDP than under a flexible exchange rate regime. As shown in the first graph below (top left), GDP in 
Ireland falls more heavily just after the shock than in Germany and Italy.  
In the second graph (top right), a shift in investors’ preferences away from dollar-denominated assets towards euro-
denominated assets leads to a risk premium shock, with the bilateral exchange rate of the dollar with respect to the 
euro falling by about 10 %. In the first year, the nominal effective exchange rate appreciation amounts to 2.8 % for 
Italy, 3.7 % for Germany and 5% for Ireland. The shift in investors' preferences raises real interest rates in the US 
and lowers those of the euro area, which boosts domestic demand in the euro area even if competitiveness 
deteriorates. The net effect on output is negative in the first stage but becomes positive in the medium run. The 
initial effects are again strongest in Ireland and weakest in Italy, but the medium run gain is largest in Ireland.  
 
GDP spillovers of a US slowdown  
(deviations from baseline in pp) 
GDP effects of a euro appreciation due to an increase 
in investors' preference for the euro 
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In the third graph, higher productivity growth in 
emerging economies in the tradable goods sector 
yields lower import prices to the benefit all euro-area 
countries, but harm exporters in countries that exhibit 
a specialisation pattern biased towards more 
traditional sectors, like Italy. Lower import prices 
boost consumption and raise GDP. A more open 
economy like Ireland benefits more from this shock. 
Exporters in Italy, however, are more exposed to 
competition from Asian producers and lose more 
market share. Italy's GDP fall in the medium run, 
unlike in Germany and, even more strongly so, in 
Ireland. 
 
Reference: 
European Commission (2006), 'The EU Economy 2006 review – Adjustment dynamics in the euro area, European 
Economy, No. 6. 
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rates observed in the past decade in the euro area 
suggests that the trade-offs between inflation 
volatility and growth volatility have so far 
remained limited, possibly as a result of a 
prevalence of demand over supply shocks. 
Moreover, in past years, many euro-area 
countries benefited from a substantial 
improvement in the conduct and credibility of 
monetary policy.20 However, in the future, not 
only may inflationary supply shocks become 
more frequent, but further improvements in the 
conduct of monetary policy are unlikely. Policy 
makers may seek to offset the adverse effects of 
supply-shock-driven inflation by fiscal stimulus, 
protectionist measures or other quick fixes. 
However, this would ultimately jeopardise 
distribution goals, endanger the sustainability of 
public finances and overburden the single 
monetary policy. Hence countries will be called 
on to demonstrate their willingness to fully 
embrace the objective of macroeconomic 
stability.  
Fourth, there is a unique and pervasive link 
between the single currency and financial market 
integration. In the absence of nominal 
adjustment via internal exchange rates it is 
essential that other channels of shock absorption 
are developed. Financial markets are a 
particularly important one as they facilitate risk 
sharing and consumption smoothing, and can 
also make the transmission of monetary policy 
more powerful whereas fiscal policy will become 
less effective.21 In addition, financial integration 
can leverage the benefits of structural reforms, 
allowing capital to flow freely to its best uses, and 
foster good incentives to reform product and 
labour markets (see Box 7). However, in light of 
the disappearance of exchange rate premia, the 
counterpart of the benefits from financial 
integration can be widening current account 
imbalances, increased risks of housing bubbles, 
boom-bust cycles and financial contagion, risks 
which are aggravated if supply rigidities in the 
                                                     
20  E.g. Cecchetti, S. G., A. Flores-Lagunes and S. Krause 
(2006), ‘Has monetary policy become more efficient? A 
cross-country analysis, Economic Journal, No. 116(511), 
pp. 408–433, April.  
21  For a survey of arguments on the risks and benefits of 
financial integration in the euro area see e.g. European 
Commission (2007), 'EU financial integration and euro-
area adjustment', Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 6, 
No. 2. 
real sector are not corrected and if regulation and 
supervision remains fragmented across euro-area 
countries.  
Fifth, rising global financial and trade integration 
is contributing to the emergence of the euro as 
an international currency alongside the dollar. 
This tendency is irrevocably altering the role of 
euro-area currency diplomacy and creates new 
responsibilities for euro-area countries in global 
macro-financial governance.  
In sum, the euro area shares with most other 
developed economies a rapidly changing global 
landscape, ageing populations and rising 
concerns about energy and climate change. These 
global trends have major implications for the 
euro area over the next ten years and beyond and 
call for determined efforts to promote growth 
and jobs, ensure efficient intra-area adjustment, 
improve the quality and sustainability of public 
finances, secure a smooth enlargement of the 
euro area and carefully manage the euro-area's 
global role. 
2.  New goals and challenges for the euro 
area 
Promoting growth and job creation 
While job creation has been impressive in the 
euro area during the past 10 years, total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth stalled compared with 
other advanced economies, notably the US. If 
left uncorrected, this tendency could be very 
costly in terms of slowing down income growth, 
jeopardising fiscal sustainability amid ageing 
populations, complicating the achievement of 
price stability as primary commodity prices soar, 
and ultimately putting a brake on employment 
growth. Indeed, the available longer-term 
projections indicate that potential growth is 
expected to halve in euro-area countries in the 
coming decades (Graph 15). This tendency will 
crucially be driven by falling labour inputs 
associated with ageing.22 Against the background  
22  See, e.g., Carone, G, C. Denis, K. McMorrow, G. Mourre 
and W. Röger. (2006), ‘Long-term labour productivity and 
GDP projections for the EU-25 Member States: A 
production function framework’, European Economy — 
Economic Papers, No. 253.  
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Box 7: Financial market integration and capital allocation 
 
Enhanced financial integration among euro-area countries is one of the most notable achievements of EMU. 
However, while research on the impact on financial integration on growth in the EU (e.g. Guiso et al. 2004) or on 
risk-sharing (e.g., Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2004) are quite abundant, much less work has so far been carried out on 
assessing the impact of the integration of financial markets on the allocation of capital. Improved capital allocation 
across productive activities is a key channel through which financial development and integration can deliver higher 
growth (higher TFP growth associated with a more productive distribution of resources across alternative uses).  
 
Against this background, this box assesses the impact of financial integration on the responsiveness of capital to 
changing productivity and cost conditions (see also Hartmann et al. 2007 and Roeger, Székely, and Turrini 2008). To 
this end, an investment variable was regressed against a measure of the 'net marginal product of capital', namely, the 
difference between the marginal product of capital and the user cost of capital. The elasticity of investment to this 
variable measures how much capital grows (or falls) in response to a positive (or negative) difference between its 
marginal product and its cost. A higher (or lower) elasticity is interpreted as characterising a more (or less) efficient 
allocation of capital, i.e., one in which there is a more (or less) effective response of capital whenever the (static) 
conditions for an efficient capital allocation are violated. This elasticity is allowed to vary depending on whether 
countries have adopted the euro and depending on the degree of financial market development and integration. In 
order to capture inertia in investment, the estimated equation also includes the 1-year lagged dependent variable. To 
capture the impact of possible omitted variables, country, sector and year fixed effects are included. Since variables 
are expressed in logarithms, the regression coefficient of the net marginal product of capital measures the elasticity of 
investment. The impact of financial integration on capital allocation is obtained by interacting the net marginal 
product of capital with indicators of integration of debt and equity instruments. 
 
The table below reports the results for the baseline investment equation. Data on investment, capital productivity, 
and costs are taken from the EUKLEMS sectoral database. Data on financial integration are taken from Lane and 
Milesi Ferretti (2006). Data vary across sectors, countries and time. The sample includes 7 euro-area countries (DE, 
ES, FR, NL, IT, AT, FI) and 3 non-euro area countries (DK, UK, US). For these countries, a full set of variables 
including capital stock, investment, TFP etc. is available. As expected, investment reacts positively and significantly 
to the net marginal product of capital. Separate regressions for countries / years corresponding to euro participation 
(i.e., for euro-area countries and after 1998) reveal that investment in the countries which adopted the euro exhibits a 
stronger response to differences between the marginal product of capital and the user cost of capital (column (3)). 
The interaction of a euro dummy with the net marginal product of capital shows that in the euro area the elasticity of 
investment is significantly different compared with the rest of the countries (column (4)). Moreover, as revealed by 
the significant coefficient of the (non-interacted) euro dummy, the euro per-se appears to be associated with 
increased investment growth, possibly reflecting expectations of lower cost of capital. 
 
Basic capital allocation equation 
Dependent variable:  
Investment share 
All years and 
countries Non-euro countries 
Participation in 
euro  All years and countries
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.561*** 0.548*** 0.626*** 0.560*** Investment share(-1) 
(19.47) (17.74) ( 7.55) (19.27) 
0.126*** 0.115*** 0.173** 0.118*** Net marginal product of capital 
(5.49) (5.12) (2.56) (5.18) 
   0.047* Net marginal product of capital * 
euro dummy    (1.83) 
   0.174** Euro dummy 
   (2.10) 
Observations 4365 3657 708 4365 
R-squared 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.48 
Notes: OLS regression, controlling for sector specific heteroskedasticy. The specification includes country, sector and year fixed effects. Absolute 
value of t statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. 
The euro dummy identifies countries part of the euro area and years after 1998. 
Investment share: log of the ratio between net real investment and lagged net real capital stock 
Net marginal product of capital: log (marginal productivity of capital) – log (user cost of capital) 
 
The table below reports results on the link between financial integration and capital allocation. The first column of 
the table analyses the role of integration in terms of debt instruments, while column (2) looks at cross-border 
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holdings of equity assets. The financial integration variables are standardised to have zero mean and unit variance, so 
that the interaction of such variables with the net marginal product variable indicates how much the elasticity of 
investment increases for a one-standard deviation increase in the degree of financial integration compared with the 
average. Both the integration of debt and equity markets appears to raise significantly the elasticity of investment. 
Conversely, those variables do not exert a significant direct impact. Since rising financial integration has coincided to 
some extent with enhanced domestic financial development, the analysis has been repeated by controlling for the 
share of credit in GDP as a measure of financial development (columns (3)-(5)). It appears that the financial 
integration variables maintain a significant impact on the elasticity of investment also after controlling for the effect 
of financial development.  
 
Capital allocation and financial integration 
Dependent variable: Investment share (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.558*** 0.557*** 0.560*** 0.559*** 0.557*** Investment share(-1) (19.43) (19.49) (19.51) (19.44) (19.44) 
0.125*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.122*** Net marginal product of capital (5.43) (5.36) (5.13) (5.11) (0.86) 
0.047   0.057  Debt integration 
(1.13)   (1.39)  
0.022**   0.020**  Net marginal product of capital * Debt integration 
(2.52)   (2.10)  
 0.056   0.051 Equity integration 
 (1.17)   (0.91) 
 0.024**   0.024* Net marginal product of capital * Equity integration 
 (2.38)   (2.00) 
  0.026 0.012 -0.011 Financial development 
  (0.93) (0.353) (0.29) 
  0.015* 0.057 0.006 Net marginal product of capital * Financial development 
  (1.86) (1.39) (0.86) 
Observations 4365 4365 4298 4298 4298 
R-squared 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.48 
Notes: OLS regression; controlling for sector specific heteroskedasticy; country, year and sector dummies. Absolute value of t statistics in 
parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. 
Debt Integration: Cross-border holdings of assets and liabilities/GDP, debt instruments. Standardised variable. 
Equity Integration: Cross-border holdings of assets and liabilities /GDP, equity instruments. Standardised variable. 
Financial development: private sector credit as share of GDP. Standardised variable. 
 
Overall, the results lend themselves to the following interpretation. The euro seems associated with greater efficiency 
in the allocation of capital across sectors and countries. Empirical work shows that the response of investment to 
differences between the marginal product and the user cost of capital has indeed increased in euro-area countries 
since 1998. Such an effect seems to be mostly explained by an accelerated pace of financial integration in euro-area 
countries in the late 1990s, for which the liberalisation of cross-border financial investment and monetary unification 
are assumed to have acted as major triggers. 
 
References: 
Guiso, L., P. Sapienza and L. Zingales (2004), ‘Does local financial development matter?’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 119(3), pp. 929–969, August. 
Hartmann, P., F. Heider, E. Papaioannou, and M. Lo Duca (2007), 'The role of financial markets and innovation in 
productivity and growth in Europe', European Central Bank Occasional Paper, No. 72. 
Kalemli-Ozcan, S., B. Sørensen and O. Yosha (2003), ‘Risk sharing and industrial specialization: Regional and 
international evidence’, American Economic Review, No. 93(3), pp. 903–18, June. 
 
of an expected contribution of capital deepening 
in line with that of other advanced economies, 
re-launching TFP growth will be key to 
containing the long-term reduction in euro-area 
growth potential. 
A crucial challenge will thus be to ensure that 
TFP growth rebounds in a context of shifting 
global comparative advantages. Financial 
integration – itself fostered by the euro – would 
clearly help in this respect as it increases the 
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Graph 15: Recent potential growth performance and 
projections: euro area and US 
(in %, period average) 
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Source: Commission services. 
responsiveness of investment to cross-country 
differences in the marginal return on capital, 
which will thus flow more abundantly to 
countries where structural conditions are most 
favourable (Box 7).23 This will tend to accentuate 
intra-area differences in growth performance, 
unless structural reforms are implemented in 
earnest in countries where structural conditions 
lag. This will require those countries to ensure 
that their firms are better able to compete at the 
technological frontier.24 This calls for better 
human capital formation, the availability of 
financial instruments to reward projects with 
high returns and risk, a policy framework 
supportive of R&D investments, and a growth-
friendly regulatory environment, notably with 
                                                     
                                                     
23  Firm-level evidence shows that reallocation effects 
account for roughly half of the total aggregate 
productivity growth (Bartelsman, E., J. Haltiwanger and S. 
Scarpetta (2006), ‘Reallocation and productivity growth: 
The FAQs’, 2006 Meeting Papers, No. 293, Society for 
Economic Dynamics).  
24  Recent economic theory has emphasised the role of 
framework conditions in enabling countries to grow via 
innovation rather than adoption of new-vintage existing 
technologies (Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (2006), 
‘Appropriate growth policy: A unifying framework’, 
Journal of the European Economic Association, No. 4, 269–314. 
Recent evidence based on the EU KLEMS sectoral 
growth database confirms the view that TFP growth in 
EU countries is increasingly driven by competition taking 
place 'at the frontier' (Havik, K., K. McMorrow, W. 
Röger and A. Turrini (2008), ‘The role of total factor 
productivity in explaining EU–US productivity 
differences: A macro, sectoral and industry level 
perspective’, European Economy — Economic Papers, 
forthcoming,).  
respect to start-up firms and would-be market 
entrants.25
Reforms in labour markets and welfare systems 
geared towards removing distortions in individual 
incentives regarding labour supply decisions 
would also be welcome.26 This would help 
contain the reduction in labour inputs associated 
with ageing, where the larger euro-area countries 
in particular are lagging. Encouraging the labour 
participation of older and female workers would 
also be beneficial, as would a smoother transition 
from education to work. Reducing the costs 
associated with workers' relocation across 
economic activities and regions would enable a 
better match between supply and demand in the 
labour market. 'Flexicurity' arrangements that 
facilitate flexible labour market responses in 
exchange for income security would support this 
further. 
Ensuring efficient intra-area adjustment 
The working of the intra-area adjustment 
channels may improve over time as a result of 
trade integration and a better anchoring of 
inflation expectations and an associated decline 
in nominal (wage and price) rigidities. Increased 
f inancial  integrat ion would also help by 
increasing risk sharing, thus permitting a more 
stable pattern of consumption over time and 
across countries. However, tensions cannot be 
ruled out, especially for those euro-area countries 
that are more exposed to increasing competition 
from emerging economies or to external 
exchange rate shocks. Structural policies are 
25  See, e.g., Scarpetta, S. and T. Tressel (2002), ‘Productivity 
and convergence in a panel of OECD industries: Do 
regulations and institutions matter?’, OECD Economics 
Department Working Papers, No. 342; Nicoletti, G. and S. 
Scarpetta (2003), 'Regulation, productivity and growth: 
OECD evidence', World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 
No. 2944; Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (2005), ‘Growth with 
quality-improving innovations: An integrated framework’, 
in P. Aghion and S. N. Durlauf (eds): Handbook of 
Economic Growth, Vol. 1A, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 
pp. 67–110.  
26  On the debate on working hours and labour supply in 
Europe versus the US see Blanchard, O. (2004), ‘The 
economic future of Europe’, NBER Working Papers, 
No. 10310; and Prescott, E. C. (2004), ‘Why do 
Americans work so much more than Europeans?’, 
Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 
pp. 2–13, July.  
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Box 8: Are reforms politically costly? 
 
Although structural reforms figure high on the European agenda, progress is slow. The main reasons why reforms 
are blocked or delayed have been analysed in theoretical literature (see e.g. Drazen (2000) for a survey), including that 
they may be politically costly. Since the gains from reforms often occur with a time lag and are thinly spread across 
the electorate, while possible costs may materialise in the short run and prompt strong reactions by vocal interest 
groups, electorally concerned governments may have little incentives to carry out bold reforms. Although this 
argument is common, analysis verifying whether it is supported by the data is scant.  
 
A recent study sheds some light on this issue, and finds that reforms are not necessarily costly in electoral terms (Buti 
et al. (2008)). It looks at the history of re-elections of heads of government in 21 OECD countries from 1985 to 
2004 and examines whether their re-election was affected by major reforms taking place before elections in the 
unemployment benefit system, labour taxes, employment protection legislation, product market regulations or 
retirement schemes. Controls are included for the generally accepted determinants of re-election probabilities, i.e. 
cyclical factors, inflation, the stance of fiscal policy, the political system (e.g. parliamentary vs. presidential, 
proportional vs. majoritarian) and the political juncture (e.g. margin of majority of the executive in Parliament, 
political polarisation between parties in the government and opposition). The study finds that reform in the election 
or in the preceding year does not significantly affect the probability of re-election of the chief executive (see table 
below). Voters do tend to reward politicians for improving cyclical conditions, while they tend to dislike an increase 
in inflation. But the fiscal stance as captured by the change in cyclically-adjusted budget balance, is not statistically 
significant for re-election probabilities.  
 
Re-election probability and economic reforms - Evidence from probit regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) Dependent variable1: 1 if the 
identity of the government 
chief executive does not 
change after elections. 
Baseline Baseline adding 
interaction with initial 
conditions 
(2) adding 
interaction with 
fiscal stance 
(3) adding interaction with 
both financial regulation 
and government size 
-0.015 0.104 0.13 0.146 
Reform dummy2 [0.09] [0.56] [0.70] [0.78] 
 -0.243 -0.241 -0.305 Overall index of market 
rigidity3 *reform dummy  [2.16]** [2.21]** [2.40]** 
 0.579 0.591 0.77 Cyclical conditions4 *reform 
dummy  [2.81]*** [2.94]*** [3.17]*** 
  0.154  Change in primary CAB4 
*reform dummy   [0.86]  
   0.361 Financial freedom5 
index*reform dummy    [5.07]*** 
   0.177 (Total Current Primary 
Expenditure / GDP)6 
*reform dummy 
   [2.23]** 
0.075 0.07 0.069 0.116 Change in cyclical 
conditions4 [2.24]** [1.82]* [1.76]* [2.37]** 
-0.022 -0.024 -0.025 -0.027 
Change in inflation4 [1.65]* [1.78]* [1.82]* [1.72]* 
0.086 0.099 -0.018 0.058 
Change in primary CAB4 [1.41] [1.87]* [0.12] [0.78] 
0.035 -0.18 -0.179 -0.253 
Cyclical conditions4 [1.64] [2.16]** [2.32]** [2.69]*** 
Political controls7  v v v 
Observations 103 101 101 101 
Notes: coefficients are marginal probability effects, robust z statistics in parenthesis (absolute value). *,**, and *** denote, respectively, significant 
at 10%, 5%, 1%. All interacted variables are standardised. 
1/ Constructed using 'Database of Political Institutions', Beck et al. (2001). 2/ 1 if in the past two years at least one of five structural indicators 
(unemployment benefit, labour taxes, EPL, product market regulations, retirement schemes) improves by more than the median positive change. 
3/ Two-year average of the overall index of market rigidities constructed in Duval (2005). The index rises as distortions fall. 4/ Two-year average 
of output gap, cyclically adjusted primary balance, inflation and their y-o-y change. Source: OECD Economic Outlook, June 2007. 5/ Two-year 
average of the index of financial freedom. Source: Fraser Institute for Economic Freedom. Higher scores denote higher freedom. 6/ Two-year 
average of total current primary expenditure, % of GDP. Source: European Commission AMECO database. 7/ In presidential systems, veto 
players are defined as the president and the largest party in the legislature. In parliamentary systems, veto players are defined as the prime minister 
and the three largest government parties. Source: Beck et al. (2001). 
Source: Commission services 
 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
 - 33 -
Results change once the reform variable is interacted with the summary index of initial structural conditions. Such 
interaction make it possible to capture whether the fact that reforms takes place in already 'reformed' countries or in 
'unreformed' ones matters in electoral terms. A further interaction considered is with the cyclical conditions, as 
captured by the level of the output gap. Results in column (2) show that reforms are less politically costly for those 
countries that are in more urgent need of structural changes and when reforms takes place in 'good times', i.e. when 
output is above potential.  
 
Colum (3) adds to the specification in (2) the interaction of the reform variable with the fiscal stance. The hypothesis 
tested is whether re-election is harder when reforms take place in periods of fiscal consolidation. Results show that 
this does not seem to be the case. The hypothesis tested in column (4) is whether, on top of the factors considered in 
specification (2), more deregulated financial markets and more effective automatic fiscal stabilisers matter for the 
impact of reforms on re-elections. It appears that less intrusive financial market regulation increases re-election 
probabilities when reforms are carried out, which is consistent with the expectation that, by bringing forward the 
future benefits of structural reform and hence increasing the net benefits of reform in the short run, more developed 
financial markets help reforming governments to be re-elected. Results also confirm that larger automatic fiscal 
stabilisers, as captured by the share of primary current expenditure on GDP, also reduce the short-run cost of 
structural reform, thereby increasing their electoral reward.  
 
These results are broadly in line with the recent reform history in advanced economies: countries with more 
developed financial markets (e.g. Anglo-Saxon countries) and more effective redistribution by the government (e.g. 
Nordic countries) scored better than others in terms of reform activism in several areas. 
 
References: 
Beck, T., G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer, and P. Walsh (2001), 'New tools in comparative political economy: The 
database of political institutions', World Bank Economic Review, 15, 165-176. 
Brender, A and A. Drazen (2008), 'How do budget deficits and economic growth affect re-election prospects? 
Evidence from a large cross-section of countries', NBER Working Paper, No. 11862. 
Buti, M., A. Turrini, P. van den Noord and P. Biroli (2008), ‘Defying the 'Juncker curse': Can reformist governments 
be re-elected?’, European Economy – Economic Papers, No. 324. 
Drazen, A. (2000), 'Political economy in macroeconomics', Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Duval, R. (2005), ‘Fiscal positions, fiscal adjustment and structural reforms in labour and product markets’, in 
Wierts,P., S. Deroose, , E. Flores, and A. Turrini (eds.), 'Fiscal Policy Surveillance in Europe', Palgrave Macmillan. 
therefore required as an insurance against shocks 
with an asymmetric impact. Reducing nominal 
rigidities, especially in the services sector, will 
help adjust price competitiveness in a stabilising 
fashion.27 The costs associated with the 
reallocation of labour will have to be reduced, 
including by reforms of employment protection, 
and strengthened active labour market policies 
and incentive-compatible safety nets.28
                                                     
27  Dhyne, E., L. J. Alvarez, H. Le Bihan, G. Veronese, D. 
Dias, J. Hoffmann, N. Jonker, P. Lunnemann, F. Rumler 
and J. Vilmunen (2006), ‘Price changes in the euro area 
and the United States: Some facts from individual 
consumer price data’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
Vol. 20(2), American Economic Association, pp. 171–
192, spring.  
28  Recent evidence indicates that the competitiveness 
channel of adjustment in the euro area reacts less 
efficiently in the presence of tight product and labour 
market regulations (Biroli, Mourre and Turrini (2008), 
'Market regulation and euro-area adjustment: An 
empirical assessment', European Economy — Economic 
Papers, forthcoming). 
Aside from risk sharing, increased financial 
integration will help adjustment by facilitating 
the reallocation of investment across activities 
and national boundaries. However, financial 
markets act as accelerators of both benign and 
perverse developments. Hence, the potential for 
increased resilience against shocks and 
consumption smoothing needs to be weighed 
against the increased risk of contagion, bubbles, 
and boom-bust cycles associated with enhanced 
financial integration, issues that require an 
adequate response in terms of national and 
supra-national prudential and regulatory policy. 
Advancements in terms of risk sharing via 
financial markets weaken the need for shock 
absorption via fiscal policy, as households are in 
a better position to smooth income shocks. The 
impact of ageing on public budgets will call for 
an accelerated public debt reduction, and this 
constraint will bite harder as financial markets 
become more developed. Against this backdrop, 
it will be important to correct any pro-cyclical 
fiscal stance in upturns so as to remove deficit 
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bias over the longer haul and support 
macroeconomic stability. Improved national-
level governance, enhanced fiscal indicators, and 
effective budgetary surveillance within the 
framework of the revised Stability and Growth 
Pact would help in this regard.29 This will also 
help to prevent inconsistencies between Member 
States' fiscal policies and between monetary and 
fiscal policies at the euro-area level. 
Improving the quality and sustainability of 
budgets 
Extensive social safety nets are a characteristic of 
most countries participating in the euro area. 
The financing and management of these safety 
nets is a main driver of the budgets of 
participating countries in the euro area. It is thus 
important that they deliver value for money and 
can be funded without compromising the 
macroeconomic stability of the country 
concerned or the area as a whole. With ageing 
kicking in soon, the window of opportunity for 
participating countries to put their fiscal house in 
order without major disruptions is rapidly 
closing.30  
On the expenditure side, public funds need to be 
used more efficiently and the growth-friendliness 
of programmes needs to be enhanced. The same 
holds true for taxation, as well as for the 
interaction between tax and benefit systems 
which still tend to discourage labour market 
participation in a number of countries. Overall, 
while measures have been taken to address the 
economic and budgetary effects of ageing, in 
several countries there appears to be room for 
further efforts to enhance the quality of public 
expenditure and taxation alongside sustainable 
fiscal positions. 
 
29  See e.g. European Commission (2006), ‘Public finances 
in EMU — 2006’, European Economy, No. 3/2006 and 
Debrun, X., L. Moulin, A. Turrini, J. Ayuso-i-Casals and 
M. S. Kumar, ‘Tied to the mast? — The role of national 
fiscal rules in the European Union’, Economic Policy 
23(54), 297-362, April.  
30  For a comprehensive assessment of fiscal sustainability in 
the EU see European Commission (2006), ‘The long-
term sustainability of public finances in the European 
Union’, European Economy, No. 4/2006.  
Enlarging the euro area smoothly 
From a longer-term perspective, all new EU 
Member States will eventually be members of 
the euro area. In the process, the composition of 
the area is changing and becoming more diverse. 
Although the economies of the new Member 
States are comparatively small, their entry into 
the euro area would clearly widen the spectrum 
of economic development levels across the area. 
For some time, these countries will continue to 
grow faster, exhibit higher Balassa-Samuelson-
induced inflation, and remain more vulnerable to 
shocks, overheating and rapid reversals of capital 
flows.  
Against this background, it is important that 
euro adoption strategies go beyond the 
achievement of 'nominal' convergence (in 
respect of the Treaty criteria) at the point of 
entry. The nominal convergence criteria set out 
by the Treaty were mainly concerned with 
preserving price stability, which is an indeed 
necessary but not sufficient condition for 
macroeconomic stability. Although these 
countries have made substantial progress in 
achieving greater resilience via flexible product 
and factor markets – arguably more so than 
some current euro-area members – the first 
major stress test is still to come.31
Graph 16: Share of foreign currency borrowing in 
domestic credit, New Member States, 2004-2006 
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Challenges ahead of euro adoption are to some 
extent specific to the exchange rate regime 
                                                     
31 Boeri, T. and P. Garibaldi (2006), ‘Are labour markets in 
the new Member States sufficiently flexible for EMU?’, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, No. 30, pp. 1393–1407.  
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adopted by each candidate euro-area member.32 
While the overall track record of policies in the 
new Member States with exchange rate pegs has 
been largely reassuring, the policy responses to 
the recent overheating episodes have not always 
been appropriate. Challenges are likely to remain 
significant, as in some cases these countries have 
incurred large liabilities denominated in euros, 
while policy instruments to smooth the 
unwinding of these positions remain limited 
(Graph 16). Against this backdrop, fiscal policy 
needs to be geared towards countering 
overheating and containing external imbalances, 
including by increasing private sector incentives 
to save. Structural and supervisory policies have 
an important role to play in safeguarding growth 
potential and macro-financial stability. Those 
countries that still avail themselves of exchange 
rate flexibility should gear their policies, 
including monetary policy, towards 
macroeconomic and financial stability so as to 
support a smooth nominal and real convergence 
process.  
Managing the euro-area's international role 
The single currency also has a global dimension, 
which will undoubtedly gain strength as 
economies and financial systems become more 
intertwined.33 The creation of a new economic 
entity matched in size only by the US, the 
emergence of the euro as a key international 
currency, and EMU’s powerful effect on the 
integration and development of the euro-area's 
financial markets are likely to have far-reaching 
consequences for the world economy and the 
international financial system. While the longer-
term role of the euro is thus clearly a global one, 
there are inertial forces that are restraining the 
euro’s international expansion for now. The US 
32  See. e.g. Schadler, S., P. Drummond, L. Kuijs, Z. 
Murgasova and R. van Elkan (2005), ‘Adopting the euro 
in central Europe: Challenges of the next step in 
European integration’, IMF Occasional Papers, No. 234.  
33  In some empirical assessments, the euro is projected to 
replace the US dollar as the main international currency 
(Chinn, M. and J. Frankel (2005), ‘Will the euro 
eventually surpass the dollar as leading international 
reserve currency?’, NBER Working Paper Series, 
No. 11510, July). A recent comprehensive assessment is 
contained in Papaioannou, E. and R. Portes (2008), ‘The 
International Role of the Euro: a Status Report’, European 
Economy – Economic Papers, 317.  
offers a broad and deep financial market for 
international investors and will continue to 
benefit form rapid expansion in its potential 
output due to demographic reasons. 
Furthermore, the euro-area's ability to keep pace 
with global financial market developments may 
be somewhat constrained by the European 
regulatory and supervisory patchwork. But 
portfolio diversification considerations, the euro-
area's prudent policy framework and the gradual 
integration and broadening of its financial 
markets will continue to support a rising 
international use of the euro in the future. 
Graph 17: Selected indicators of capital market size, 
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Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, September 2007. 
An enhanced international role of the euro 
brings both benefits and costs. On the one hand, 
greater use of the euro by non-euro-area 
residents brings seigniorage and competitive 
advantages for euro-area exporters and financial 
institutions.34 On the other, it could also lead to 
a possible increase in macroeconomic 
volatility.35 In the medium term, however, the 
advantages of having an international currency 
are likely to outweigh the costs. 
                                                     
34  An aspect that has been discussed in recent debates is the 
so-called 'exhorbitant privilege', namely the premium on 
the returns on net foreign assets benefiting the country 
issuing the leading international currency (Gourinchas, P. 
O. and H. Rey (2007), ‘From world banker to world 
venture capitalist: US external adjustment and the 
exorbitant privilege’, in R. Clarida (ed.): G7 current account 
imbalances: Sustainability and adjustment, Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press).  
35  See e.g. Wyplosz, C. (1997), ‘An international role for the 
euro?’, report prepared for the European Capital Market 
Institute (ECMI). 
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The euro also brings benefits to the global 
economy as a whole. By promoting 
macroeconomic and financial stability inside the 
euro area, EMU works in favour of global 
stability, particularly in neighbouring regions. By 
providing deep and liquid euro-denominated 
financial instruments, the euro facilitates 
international risk sharing and consumption 
smoothing not only among euro-area countries 
but also among third countries.36 At the same 
time, a wider use of the euro worldwide may 
amplify the impact of euro-area developments 
on the rest of the world, which increases the 
relevance of macroeconomic policy decisions in 
the euro area for financial markets worldwide. 
The international status of the euro and the 
increasing global relevance of euro-area 
economic developments thus bring with them 
new global surveillance responsibilities and raise 
the issue of how to ensure adequate formation, 
representation, and communication of common 
euro-area positions in the main multilateral fora. 
3.  Exploiting policy synergies 
Most of the policy objectives that appear worth 
pursuing in the context of the euro area – 
including boosting growth, enhancing the 
adjustment capacity and ensuring 
macroeconomic stability – are not mutually 
conflicting. Indeed some are even mutually 
reinforcing. Policies aimed at raising potential 
growth would also help to ensure that public 
finances evolve on a stable footing. Reforms 
aimed at improving price signals in goods and 
factor markets and at reducing the costs of 
reallocating labour across economic activities 
and regions will contribute to employment and 
productivity growth and also make euro-area 
economies more resilient to shocks. Improved 
supervision and regulation of financial markets 
would limit the risks of boom-bust dynamics, 
thus contributing to macroeconomic stability in 
euro-area incumbents, and would at the same 
time ease some of the trade-offs likely to arise 
on the convergence path for the countries that 
have yet to join the euro.  
36  Gerlach, S. and M. Hoffmann (2008), ‘The impact of the 
euro on international stability and volatility’, European 
Economy – Economic Papers, No. 309.  
A concern may be that the price to pay to 
accelerate the growth potential is a more unequal 
distribution of income. Income distributions 
have become more unequal in most countries 
since the 1980s (Graph 18). This rise in income 
inequality – and the concomitant change in the 
distribution of wealth – is commonly attributed 
to the observed shift of labour demand from 
unskilled to skilled workers associated with 
globalisation and skill-biased technological 
progress. Such tendencies are likely to get 
stronger in the future. However, in view of the 
diversity of national experiences, both in terms 
of timing and magnitude of the changes in 
income distribution, domestic institutional 
factors must also play a role.37 Labour market 
and welfare institutions have had a key role in 
transmitting trade and technology shocks to 
relative wages and unemployment rates.38  
Graph 18: Gini indexes of income 
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Source: OECD 
Although possible tensions between structural 
reforms and income distribution are not 
necessarily ruled out, such tensions can be 
contained if policies are appropriately designed 
and certain framework conditions are in place. 
                                                     
37  Atkinson, A. (2003), ‘Income inequality in OECD 
countries: Data and explanations’, CESifo Economic 
Studies, Vol. 49(4), pp. 479–513. 
38  Atkinson, A. (2000), ‘The changing distribution of 
income: Evidence and explanations’, German Economic 
Review, Vol. 1(1), pp. 3–18; Gottschalk, P. and T. M. 
Smeeding (1997), ‘Cross-national comparisons of 
earnings and income inequality’, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 35, pp. 633–687, June; Checchi, D. and C. 
Garcia-Peñalosa (2005), ‘Labour market institutions and 
the personal distribution of income in the OECD’, 
CESifo Working Papers, No. 1608.  
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Some EU countries show a stronger 
performance in terms of both growth and 
employment on the one hand and inequality and 
poverty on the other, while other countries 
perform poorly on both scores.39 This suggests 
there is room for improving economic 
performance without compromising income 
distribution by improving the efficiency of 
institutions. It needs also be taken into account 
that increased inequality associated with a 
number of labour market reforms is mainly 
transitory, since it is related to the hardship of 
job reallocation.  
Moreover, some growth-friendly reforms may 
create positive synergies with income 
distribution rather than a trade-off. Policies to 
increase skills help to contain the dispersion of 
income by leading to a lower wage differentials 
between skilled and unskilled labour. Policies 
aimed at reducing long-term unemployment 
reduce inequality as well. Measures aimed at 
reducing obstacles to financial market 
integration help to ease credit constraints facing 
low-income earners.40
Finally, it needs to be stressed that a strong 
growth potential is a pre-requisite to underpin 
the comparatively generous social welfare 
systems present in most euro-area economies. In 
this respect, growth-friendly reforms and income 
distribution are not at odds in the longer term. 
4.  Reaping the benefits of policy co-
ordination 
In general terms, there is a rationale for 
economic policy coordination wherever the 
effects of policies in one country spill over to 
other countries. Economic policy spillovers in 
EMU differ from those arising under flexible 
exchange rate arrangements. Members of EMU 
share a large amount of 'club goods', including 
monetary stability, interest rates, the external 
exchange rate and the current account 
                                                     
39  Sapir, A. (2006), ‘Globalisation and the reform of 
European social models’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 44, pp. 369–390.  
40  Levine, R. (2005), ‘Finance and growth: Theory and 
evidence’, in P. Aghion and S. Durlauf (eds): Handbook of 
economic growth, Elsevier Science.  
position.41 The existence of club goods raises 
the issue of free-riding in monetary unions, 
where some members may lack incentives to 
fully and voluntarily contribute to the effective 
functioning of the monetary union.  
The Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact 
provide the institutional framework to deal with 
free-riding in the fiscal domain. However, the 
proper functioning of a monetary union also 
depends on other club goods, most prominently: 
(i) the efficiency of intra-area adjustment in the 
absence of an internal exchange rate mechanism, 
and (ii) the ability to reach common positions in 
global macro-financial policy making and pursue 
them effectively.42 On these aspects the policy 
co-ordination of EMU appears to be less 
equipped to deal with free-riding. 
With regard to intra-area adjustment, the current 
EMU set-up refrains from placing specific 
constraints on national policy-makers other than 
that policies should be conducted in accordance 
with 'the principle of open market economy with 
free competition' and should be considered as 
matters of 'common concern' to be coordinated 
'within in the Council' (EC Treaty Article 99). 
The institutional arrangements for coordination 
of adjustment-friendly structural policies have 
evolved considerably, in particular with the re-
launch of the Lisbon strategy. Even so, less 
weight is attached to coordination of structural 
reforms than is given to the provisions on fiscal 
policy in the EMU set-up despite the fact that it 
is in euro-area countries' common interest that 
partner countries carry out reforms that improve 
their adjustment capacity. Indeed, as shown in 
the model simulations in Graph 19, should 
nominal rigidities be reduced in the euro area 
spillovers from asymmetric shocks would be 
reduced. Also, the current set-up of economic 
coordination in EMU is not strongly equipped 
to ensure consistency among national policies 
41  See Cohen, D. and C. Wyplosz (2006), ‘European 
monetary union: An agnostic evaluation’, CEPR 
Discussion Papers, No. 306. and Jacquet, P. and J. Pisani-
Ferry (2001), Economic policy coordination in the eurozone: 
What has been achieved? What should be done?, London: 
Centre for European Reform. 
42  Von Hagen, J. and S. Mundschen (2003), ‘The 
functioning of economic policy coordination’, in Buti, M. 
and A. Sapir (eds.), EMU and Economic Policy in Europe – 
The Challenge of the Early Years, Edward Elgar. 
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5.  Concluding remarks with direct implications for competitiveness. In 
this respect, while in the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) that preceded EMU, 
exchange rate realignments were perceived as a 
common concern and were subject to 
commonly agreed principles, no similar 
framework is available in EMU to discuss 
internal devaluations and other policies with a 
direct bearing on competitiveness.  
In its first ten years the policy agenda of EMU 
has pursued macroeconomic stability via the 
anchoring of inflation expectations and 
safeguarding fiscal discipline. This agenda has 
been supported by EU policies to promote 
structural reforms in product, labour and 
financial markets and address divergences in 
macroeconomic performance across countries. 
Although progress has been made on all these 
policy objectives, further progress is needed.  
Graph 19: Cumulated spillovers under alternative 
exchange rate regimes  
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The experience of the first ten years has shown 
that a call on macroeconomic policy discipline, 
and delivery on that goal, does not automatically 
entail progress with structural reform and market 
integration, nor does it ensure high quality and 
sustainable public finances in the longer run, or 
secure a smooth enlargement and a strong global 
presence of the euro area. Yet these are 
necessary conditions for robust growth, flexible 
adjustment to disturbances and the smooth 
operation of EMU at large. This – coupled with 
the pressing challenges of globalisation, scarce 
natural resources, climate change and population 
ageing – calls for improved co-ordination of 
economic policies, further progress with 
structural reforms, a stronger global role for the 
euro area and an unwavering commitment by 
Member States to achieving these goals. The fact 
that the effects of these global trends are already 
being felt in high energy, food and commodity 
prices, financial turbulence and global exchange 
rate adjustment only underscores the importance 
of timely action. 
Source: Commission services. 
Regarding the role of the euro area in global 
macro-financial policy making, although an 
increasing degree of co-ordination is already 
taking place among euro-area countries, 
including in the realm of multilateral 
consultations on global imbalances, co-
ordination gains are still far from being fully 
exploited. 
Overall, although there could also be tendencies 
that raise the costs of coordination, such as the 
increasing number of member countries and 
their diversity, the ongoing global trends will 
most likely raise the need of fully reaping the 
unexploited co-ordination gains in EMU. In 
particular, enhanced co-ordination will be 
required to foster reforms that improve growth 
and adjustment, to endow the euro area with a 
surveillance framework aimed at ensuring that 
macroeconomic policies are consistent with 
adjustment needs, to ensure orderly financial 
market developments, and to raise the ability of 
the euro area to speak with one voice in 
multilateral fora.  
In order to address these challenges and prepare 
EMU for the future, the Commission has 
presented a three-pronged policy agenda in its 
EMU@10 Communication and Report, based 
on a domestic pillar, an external pillar and 
initiatives to strengthen EMU’s economic 
governance. This policy agenda is presented in 
more details in the next section. 
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III. A three-pillar policy agenda for the second decade 
In order to address the challenges discussed in the previous section and prepare EMU for the next decade and beyond, the 
Commission has presented a broad three-pillar policy agenda. The first pillar is domestic. It aims to deepen fiscal policy co-
ordination and surveillance, to broaden macroeconomic surveillance in EMU beyond fiscal policy and to better integrate 
structural reform in overall policy co-ordination within EMU. This should enhance the quality of public finances, entail a 
more effective implementation of the preventive arm of the SGP and help to identify emerging macroeconomic imbalances at an 
earlier stage. It should also help to remove the remaining barriers to product market integration, improve the functioning of 
labour markets, foster EU financial integration and enhance financial stability arrangements. The second pillar concerns the 
external dimension of the euro. It aims to enhance the euro-area's role in global economic governance by consolidating its 
external representation, with the ultimate objective of a single seat in the relevant international fora. The third pillar deals 
with governance issues. To ensure that EMU functions effectively it is necessary to fully involve the ECOFIN Council. 
ECOFIN remains the policy-setting and legislative forum for issues relating to EMU and much of the progress with the 
proposed policy agenda for the euro area will depend upon wider support in ECOFIN. But it is also crucial to develop the 
agenda and the debates in the Eurogroup to deepen and broaden policy coordination and surveillance in the euro area.  
The experience of the first decade of EMU, 
while overall very successful, reveals a number of 
shortcomings that need to be addressed. It will 
be necessary to consolidate the hard-won 
macroeconomic stability while: (a) raising 
potential growth and safeguarding and increasing 
the welfare of euro-area citizens; (b) ensuring a 
smooth adjustment capacity as EMU expands to 
take in new members; and (c) successfully 
protecting the interests of the euro area in the 
global economy. Importantly, these efforts will 
have to be made in a global environment that has 
changed considerably since the euro was 
launched, and failure to do so will be much more 
costly now. 
To address these challenges, the Commission has 
proposed a broad policy agenda based on a 
domestic pillar, an external pillar and initiatives 
to strengthen EMU's system of governance.  
1.  The domestic policy agenda: better 
co-ordination and surveillance 
Deepening and broadening surveillance 
The corrective arm of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) should continue to be applied 
rigorously and surveillance under the SGP's 
preventive arm should be improved. Fiscal policy 
coordination should better guide national 
budgetary behaviour over the whole cycle, i.e. in 
both good and bad times. Budgetary surveillance 
should be deepened to cover two main areas:  
(i) securing the sustainability of public finances for the 
benefit of future generations. At the national level, the 
adoption of medium-term fiscal frameworks 
could go a long way towards achieving stable and 
sustainable public finances. To be effective, such 
frameworks should encompass well-designed 
expenditure rules, which would allow the 
automatic fiscal stabilisers to operate within the 
limits of the SGP while attuning the composition 
of public expenditure to the structural and 
cyclical needs of the economy. At the euro-area 
level increased attention should be put on 
monitoring public debt developments, while 
medium-term budgetary objectives should be 
strengthened to address implicit liabilities. 
Moreover, long-term budgetary projections 
which identify the impact of ageing on public 
finances can support the preparation of national 
sustainability strategies and promote measures to 
reform pension and health systems and increase 
employment rates.  
(ii) enhancing the quality of public finances. In other 
words, ensuring better value for public money, 
by channelling public expenditure and taxation 
systems towards growth-friendly and 
competitiveness-enhancing activities. Reforms of 
social expenditure programmes that offer better 
income protection while strengthening incentives 
to work – the flexicurity approach – would also 
greatly help to enhance the sustainability and 
quality of public finances while ensuring that 
budgets support macroeconomic stability.  
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But beyond budgetary surveillance, there is a 
clear need to broaden surveillance to address 
macroeconomic imbalances. Developments 
within Member States such as the growth of 
current account deficits, persistent inflation 
divergences or trends of unbalanced growth need 
to be monitored given that the occurrence of 
spillover effects and the growing 
interdependence of euro-area economies mean 
these developments represent a concern not just 
for the country in question but for the euro area 
as a whole. The evidence of the first ten years of 
EMU indicates that while market integration, 
particularly in financial services, is beneficial 
overall for EMU – as it can help absorb 
macroeconomic disturbances by providing risk-
sharing opportunities and fostering reallocation 
of resources – it can also, if not accompanied by 
appropriate policies, amplify divergences among 
the participating countries. While some of these 
divergences can be benign – reflecting the 
catching-up process or even normal adjustment – 
they may also be harmful and the result of 
inefficient adjustment. In this case, enhanced 
surveillance would help the affected countries to 
devise early responses before divergences 
become entrenched.  
Finally, a broader surveillance of euro-area 
candidate countries, akin to that proposed for 
current euro-area members, will be crucial to 
help them prepare for the challenges of sharing a 
single currency. Many future euro-area members 
are experiencing large capital inflows (reflecting 
expectations of continued fast income growth) 
and rapidly developing financial sectors, both of 
which can boost credit (typically from a low 
base) and result in external imbalances. Currently 
surveillance of prospective euro-area countries 
takes place via the assessment of Convergence 
Programmes. But there is scope to provide 
stronger policy guidance and closer surveillance 
of economic developments in particular for the 
countries participating in the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) II framework, which is both 
an element of the euro adoption criteria and an 
instrument to foster sustainable nominal and real 
convergence. This should not mean imposing 
any additional constraints on euro-area entry. 
Surveillance must build on the existing 
instruments. The key instruments for fiscal policy 
surveillance and economic policy coordination 
are clearly anchored in the Treaty and the SGP. 
The enforcement of the corrective arm of the 
SGP will remain a key pillar in dissuading non-
compliance with the Treaty. The SGP provides 
for the definition and assessment of medium-
term budgetary strategies through Council 
opinions on national Stability Programmes. 
Article 99 of the Treaty states that "Member 
States shall regard their economic policies as a 
matter of common concern” and “shall 
coordinate them within the Council". The euro-
area and country-specific recommendations of 
the Lisbon process are key instruments for 
guidance and surveillance. There is, however, 
scope to improve the way such instruments are 
used. The analysis of the first 10 years reinforces 
the case for strengthening the preventive part of 
the SGP, as endorsed by the ECOFIN Council, 
to support the achievement of sustainable 
budgetary policies and address broader issues 
which may affect the macroeconomic stability of 
a country and the overall functioning of EMU. 
These Treaty-based instruments are 
complemented by the Medium-Term Budgetary 
Review process undertaken by the Eurogroup in 
the spring of each year. While it has so far 
focused on budgetary surveillance, this peer 
review mechanism should broaden its scope to 
make the Treaty-based surveillance more 
effective. 
Better integrating structural policies in the 
co-ordination process  
The euro area has a special interest in the success 
of structural reform. Stepping up reforms – of 
course welcome in the EU as a whole – is an 
absolute must for the euro area. Importantly, 
improved market responses will pay a double 
dividend – by boosting growth in living standards 
over the longer haul while allowing better 
adjustment to shocks and fostering 
macroeconomic stability. Empirical evidence 
from our analysis indicates that structural 
reforms in countries sharing the single currency 
have higher "multipliers" than elsewhere: that is, 
those countries undertaking structural reforms 
can accrue more benefit while those falling 
behind may pay a higher price for their inaction. 
The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs, which 
has been instrumental in putting structural 
reform on the policy agenda, provides the basis 
for identifying the most pressing areas for action 
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through Guideline No. 6 on the euro area and 
the euro-area-specific recommendations. In a 
partnership approach between the Commission 
and the Member States, the Lisbon Strategy 
forms the basis for steering the reform process in 
both the euro area and the individual countries. 
Removing remaining barriers to product market 
integration is essential for a well-functioning euro 
area. Yet despite the boost given by EMU and 
the Single Market Programme to the creation of 
more open and competitive economies, low 
productivity growth and entry barriers, especially 
in services, are still hampering efficient 
adaptation to changing economic circumstances 
in the euro area and are keeping up pressure on 
prices. Innovation and technology diffusion, 
important elements for enhancing both 
competition and productivity, are lagging behind 
in euro-area member states. The market 
monitoring system proposed in the Single Market 
Review should be used to specifically target these 
shortcomings. 
Better-functioning labour markets are needed in 
the euro area to underpin adjustment in a 
globalised economy and raise growth potential in 
the face of ageing populations. Greater wage 
flexibility and differentiation across industries, 
occupations and regions, and investment in 
human capital are instrumental in boosting 
competitiveness and allowing the smooth 
reallocation of resources in the event of shocks. 
Numerous reforms to raise labour utilisation 
have been undertaken in the framework of the 
Lisbon Strategy – and have paid off. However, 
progress has been uneven across countries and 
should therefore remain at the core of reform 
strategies in the next decade. Reforms of social 
expenditure programmes and active labour 
market policies should aim to offer better income 
protection while strengthening incentives to 
work.  
The euro area can draw comparatively large 
benefits from promoting EU financial 
integration. Significant progress has been made 
in integrating EU financial markets but further 
efforts are required to enhance the efficiency and 
liquidity of euro-area financial markets. This 
would facilitate economic adjustment through 
risk sharing and promote a more uniform 
transmission of the single monetary policy across 
the euro area. In particular, increased effort is 
required to promote the cross-border provision 
of retail financial services, to improve the 
efficiency of corporate and government bond 
financing and ease regulatory and supervisory 
costs for financial intermediaries operating in a 
multi-jurisdictional environment. Given the 
shared responsibility of the Eurosystem and 
participating Member States to safeguard 
financial stability in the euro area as a whole, 
there is a growing need for stronger cross-border 
cooperation in arrangements for crisis 
prevention, management and resolution as 
financial integration proceeds. In light of these 
specific efficiency and stability considerations 
and taking on board the lessons of the current 
financial turmoil, the euro area should take a 
strong role in fostering the EU agenda for 
financial integration and in enhancing EU 
financial stability arrangements.  
To reap the full potential of EMU, there is 
therefore a need to strengthen the incentives to 
pursue reform in the euro area. Integrating 
structural policies in the euro area coordination 
process can provide support via three avenues:   
• The recommendations to the euro area as a 
whole together with the country-specific 
recommendations made within the 
Integrated Guidelines of the Lisbon Strategy 
provide the backbone for the coordination 
of structural reforms; a closer monitoring of 
their implementation needs to be organised.  
• The reform of the SGP in 2005 created the 
possibility, when assessing progress towards 
the medium-term budgetary objectives, to 
take account of structural reforms that are 
fiscally costly in the short run but yield 
longer-term gains in terms of growth and 
fiscal sustainability. To ensure compliance 
with the commitments enshrined in the SGP, 
a peer review mechanism could be 
established based on the analytical 
framework developed under the Lisbon 
Strategy and ex ante information provided by 
Member States.  
• To achieve a better sequencing of reforms, 
particular priority should be given to 
improving the functioning of financial 
markets. This would not only have 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area II/2008 
 
 
 
- 42 - 
favourable effects on growth and 
adjustment, but would also help boost the 
incentives for other structural reforms to 
follow by bringing forward their longer-term 
benefits and allowing capital to flow to the 
new investment opportunities generated by 
these structural reforms. 
2.  The external policy agenda: 
enhancing the euro area's 
international role 
The international status of the euro brings 
advantages, responsibilities and risks. It helps 
develop the financial industry in Europe, yields 
seignorage gains from the use of the euro as a 
reserve currency and reduces exposure to 
exchange rate volatility as pricing and invoicing 
in euros develops. But the sheer size of the euro 
area means that policy decisions and economic 
developments within EMU are felt elsewhere, 
not least because global financial markets are 
acting as an ever-stronger international 
transmission channel. And there are risks, as the 
growing international status of the euro exposes 
the euro area to disruptive portfolio shifts 
between key international currencies and asset 
classes. All in all, the growth of the euro as an 
international currency and the combined strength 
of the euro-area economy have changed the rules 
of the game for the members of EMU and for 
their international partners. 
The euro area must therefore build an 
international strategy commensurate with the 
international status of its currency. Following a 
successful first decade, the euro area, which 
already provides a stability anchor for its 
neighbours, is now called upon to develop a clear 
and all encompassing strategy on international 
economic and financial affairs. It has to play a 
more active and assertive role both in multilateral 
fora and through its bilateral dialogues with 
strategic partners. It has to improve coordination 
and define common positions and – when 
appropriate – common terms of reference on all 
these issues. It has to speak with a single voice 
on exchange rate policies and assume its 
responsibilities in financial stability and 
macroeconomic surveillance issues. The risk that 
the unwinding of global imbalances 
disproportionately harms the competitiveness of 
the euro area and its members is adding to these 
needs.  
The most effective way for the euro area to align 
its influence with its economic weight is by 
developing common positions and by 
consolidating its representation, ultimately 
obtaining a single seat in the relevant 
international financial institutions and fora. This 
is an ambitious aim and progress on the external 
agenda will depend first and foremost on a more 
effective system of euro-area governance. Even 
though the EU and euro area are often seen by 
other countries as over-represented in 
international organisations (in terms of both seats 
and voting power), the euro area still punches 
below its economic weight in international fora. 
Consolidating the euro-area’s representation 
would strengthen its international negotiating 
power and reduce the costs of international 
coordination, both for the euro area and for its 
key partners. It would also free up much needed 
space for emerging market countries to increase 
their participation in international financial 
institutions.  
3.  Promoting effective governance of 
EMU 
EMU's system of economic governance must rise 
to the challenges facing the euro area. That said, 
the current division of responsibility between the 
institutions and instruments that govern the 
conduct of economic policy in EMU is sound 
overall. Nevertheless, there is a clear need to 
adapt institutions and practices to tackle the 
emerging policy challenges.  
A strong involvement of all EU Member States 
within the ECOFIN Council is key to ensuring 
that EMU functions effectively. From the outset 
the ECOFIN Council has been the forum for 
economic policy decision-making in the EU and, 
in view of the evolving overlap between the euro 
area and the EU, it should remain centre stage in 
EMU's system of economic governance by 
integrating EMU issues more thoroughly in its 
work. In particular, it could push for a more 
consistent approach within its own fields of 
competence – i.e. macroeconomic policy, 
financial markets and taxation – so as to ensure 
positive synergies between them. The current 
Treaty provides ample scope for more 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
 - 43 -
comprehensive coordination and surveillance 
along these lines across the whole EU.  
The Eurogroup should continue to serve as a 
platform for the deepening and broadening of 
policy coordination and surveillance in EMU. In 
terms of fiscal surveillance, ex ante coordination 
of budgetary policy through the Mid-Term 
Budgetary Review should be geared to guiding 
fiscal behaviour over the cycle as a means to 
address any pro-cyclical bias. In view of the 
ageing challenge, a major task is to increase the 
effectiveness of the preventive arm of the SGP in 
fostering the achievement of ambitious medium 
term objectives. To avoid the build-up of 
imbalances and excessive divergences between 
euro area countries, the Eurogroup should 
exchange views, develop policy guidelines and 
monitor Member States' compliance in areas that 
foster adjustment capacity and macroeconomic 
stability. “Peer reviews” – multilateral discussions 
on relevant developments in one or several 
countries – should be strengthened to encourage 
ministers of finance to consider national issues 
and policies within a euro-area perspective. 
Moreover, the Eurogroup should devote greater 
attention to monitoring the euro-area Lisbon 
recommendations in order to increase potential 
growth and strengthen competitiveness through 
structural reforms.  
The Commission should play a strong, 
supportive role to ensure the effective 
functioning of EMU. It is called upon to foster 
the coordination of policies while internalising 
the EMU dimension in its policy proposals. It 
should step up its fiscal and macroeconomic 
surveillance and promote further economic and 
financial integration. In its surveillance role, it 
should deepen the assessment of economic and 
financial developments of the euro area, focusing 
in particular on the spillovers of national policy 
measures. Work to improve the accuracy of 
cyclical and structural fiscal indicators should 
continue, in cooperation with the Member States. 
As to the international agenda, the Commission 
needs to enhance its role in international 
dialogues and fora. In sum, the Commission 
must support efforts to improve the functioning 
of EMU both domestically and internationally by 
assuming the responsibilities assigned to it by the 
Treaty as the guardian of sound economic 
policies. To this end it should endeavour to 
better exploit the instruments provided by the 
Treaty.  
EMU's governance system must ensure that 
euro-area enlargement continues smoothly. Over 
the next decade, the euro area is set to expand to 
encompass most current EU Member States and 
ensuring that this process proceeds appropriately 
will safeguard the effective functioning of the 
euro-area economy in the future. During 
participation in ERM II, countries should 
capitalise on the environment of enhanced 
macroeconomic stability to adopt sound 
macroeconomic and structural policies. As 
specified in the Treaty, the Commission should 
provide a regular, fair assessment of sustainable 
progress in the convergence process. The 
Eurogroup and ECOFIN in turn have a special 
responsibility to build trust, survey economic 
developments and provide the necessary 
guidance in terms of the policies and reforms 
necessary for prospective euro-area members' 
nominal and real convergence.  
There is also a need to improve the dialogue 
concerning EMU among the EU institutions and 
with the public at large. The Commission should 
develop its dialogue and consultation with the 
European Parliament in particular, as well as 
other European and national stakeholders. In a 
similar vein, the Eurogroup should pursue 
dialogues with the ECB, the European 
Parliament and the social partners in the euro 
area. All these institutions, starting with the 
Commission, should improve communication on 
EMU issues to the wider public. In particular, 
there is a need to better explain the euro's 
significant macro- and microeconomic 
advantages, such as its role as a protective shield 
during the recent financial turmoil, and the 
significant, beneficial contribution of economic 
policies in EMU. 
4.  Conclusion 
Achieving this policy agenda swill go a long way 
towards meeting the challenges that the euro area 
and the global economy are facing. It will also 
bring important positive benefits for all EU 
members: 
• EMU remains a milestone of EU integration. 
Although its objectives and achievements are 
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predominantly economic, EMU has never 
been solely an economic project. From the 
outset EMU was conceived as a crucial step 
in the process of EU integration. This role 
has become even stronger since the EU’s 
enlargement from 15 to 27 Member States 
since 2004, with all newly acceded EU 
member countries preparing for euro 
adoption. The prospect of euro-area 
accession has been one of the main drivers 
of those countries’ convergence with the 
EU’s standard of living. 
• A well-functioning EMU is a major asset for 
the EU as a whole, not least since the 
overwhelming majority, if not all, of EU 
countries will eventually become members of 
EMU. A thriving euro-area economy will 
contribute to the wealth and dynamism of 
the whole EU, reinforcing public support for 
EU integration both within and outside the 
euro area. 
• A strong EMU will also foster the EU's 
leadership in the global economy. A well-
functioning euro area lays the foundations 
for EMU to play a strong role externally, 
both in the macroeconomic sphere and in 
the area of global financial supervision and 
regulation. Proving its ability to strengthen 
the euro area’s external role and assume its 
global responsibilities will have positive spin-
offs for other policy areas where the EU 
aspires to global leadership, e.g. sustainable 
development, development aid, trade policy, 
competition and human rights. 
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IV. Recent DG ECFIN publications  
1. Policy documents 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 1. 2008 
Spring economic forecast 2008-2009 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12532_en.htm
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 2. 2008 
EMU@10:successes and challenges after 10 years of Economic and Monetary Union  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12680_en.htm
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 3. 2008 
Convergence Report 2008 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12576_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No. 33. June 2007 
Main results of the 2007 fscal notifications presented by the candidate countries
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary5954_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No. 34. June 2007 
Guiding principles for product market and sector monitoring 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary5923_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No. 35. November 2007 
Pensions schemes and projection models in EU-25 Member States 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary10175_en.htm
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No. 36. December 2007 
Progress toward meeting the economic criteria for accession: the assessments of the 2007 Progress Reports
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary10568_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No. 37. March 2008 
The quality of public finances. Findings of the EPC Working Group (2004-2007)
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12186_en.htm
2. Analytical documents  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 320.  
Martin Larch and Alessandro Turrini (European Commission) 
Received wisdom and beyond: Lessons from fiscal consolidation in the EU 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12423_en.htm
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 321.  
Richard Baldwin (Graduate Institute, Geneva), Virginia DiNino (Bank of Italy), Lionel Fontagné (Paris School of 
Economics, Université Paris I), Roberto A. De Santis and Daria Taglioni (ECB) 
Study on the Impact of the Euro on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12592_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 322. 
G. Russell Kincaid (International Monetary Fund) 
Adjustment Dynamics in the Euro Area – A Fresh Look at the Role of Fiscal Policy Using a DSGE 
Approach 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12598_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 323.  
Alessandro Turrini (European Commission) 
Fiscal policy and the cycle in the Euro Area: The role of government revenue and expenditure 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12602_en.htm
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area II/2008 
 
 
 
- 46 - 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 324 
Marco Buti, Alessandro Turrini, Paul Van den Noord (European Commission), and Pietro Biroli (Rodolfo 
Debenedetti Foundation) 
Defying the 'Juncker Curse': Can Reformist Governments Be Re-elected? 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12588_en.htm
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 325.  
Lars Jonung and Jarmo Kontulainen, (European Commission) 
Growth and income distribution in an integrated Europe: Does EMU make a difference? 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12676_en.htm
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 326 
Marco Buti and Mario Nava (European Commission)  
"Constrained Flexibility" as a tool to facilitate reform of the EU budget 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12664_en.htm
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 327.  
CASE (Centre for Social and Economic Research) 
The economic aspects of the energy sector in CIS countries 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12684_en.htm
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 329.  
Yung Chul Park (Korea University) and Charles Wyplosz (The Gaduate Institute, Geneva and CEPR )    
Monetary and Financial Integration in East Asia: The Relevance of European Experience 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12720_en.htm
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 330 
Petra M. Geraats, University of Cambridge 
ECB Credibility and Transparency
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12716_en.htm
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 331.  
Laura González Cabanillas and Eric Ruscher (European Commission) 
The Great Moderation in the euro area: What role have macroeconomic policies played?
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12755_en.htm
 
3. Regular publications  
Euro area GDP indicator (Indicator-based forecast of quarterly GDP growth in the euro area) 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db_indicators9239_en.htm
Business and Consumer Surveys (harmonised surveys for different sectors of the economies in the European 
Union (EU) and the applicant countries)  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db_indicators8650_en.htm
Business Climate Indicator for the euro area (monthly indicator designed to deliver a clear and early assessment 
of the cyclical situation) 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db_indicators8650_en.htm
Key indicators for the euro area (presents the most relevant economic statistics concerning the euro area)  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db_indicators9237_en.htm
Monthly and quarterly notes on the euro-denominated bond markets (looks at the volumes of debt issued, the 
maturity structures, and the conditions in the market) 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publ_list2607.htm
Price and Cost Competitiveness 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db_indicators8642_en.htm
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V. Key indicators for the euro area 
 
1 Output 2005 2006 2007 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -7.2 2.2 4.4 1.6 1.1 0.2 0.1 -2.0 -2.2
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch 1.4 4.0 3.5 0.1 0.7 0.3 -0.2 -- --
  2005 2006 2007 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 07Q4 08Q1 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 qoq. % ch 1.6 2.7 2.6 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.7
2 Private consumption 2005 2006 2007 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -13.9 -9.1 -4.9 -8.7 -11.5 -12.0 -12.1 -12.4 -14.7
 Retail sales 2.2 mom % ch 1.2 1.6 1.0 0.1 0.5 -0.2 -0.4 -- --
  2005 2006 2007 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 07Q4 08Q1 
 Private consumption 2.3 qoq. % ch 1.6 1.8 1.5 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.5 -0.1 --
3 Investment 2005 2006 2007 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 07Q4 08Q1 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 81.3 83.0 84.2 83.9 84.4 84.8 84.1 84.0 83.9
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 qoq. % ch 3.1 5.3 4.9 1.4 1.3 0.0 1.1 0.8 --
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.3 --
4 Labour market 2005 2006 2007 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08
 Unemployment 4.1 % 8.8 8.3 7.4 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.1 -- --
   2005 2006 2007 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 07Q4 08Q1 
 Employment 4.2 yoy % ch 0.9 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.7 --
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 2.3 3.8 6.2 5.0 5.1 6.0 6.5 7.2 7.6
 Wages 4.4 yoy % ch 2.8 2.5 2.8 2.1 2.3 2.8 2.6 2.9 --
5 International transactions  2005 2006 2007 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -15.6 -1.1 3.5 1.2 -1.8 -2.4 -1.9 -4.6 -6.2
 World trade 5.2 Index 158.5 173.4 185.0 187.1 193.8 191.3 189.1 -- --
 Exports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 1236.8 1383.4 1497.9 123.8 132.2 133.0 129.1 -- --
 Imports of goods 5.4 Bn. EUR 1227.4 1397.1 1473.4 125.6 133.5 131.5 131.5 -- --
 Trade balance 5.5 Bn. EUR 9.5 -14.4 22.3 -1.7 -1.3 1.6 -2.4 -- --
   2005 2006 2007 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 07Q4 08Q1 
 Exports of goods and services 5.6 qoq. % ch 4.7 7.9 6.0 3.3 0.8 0.9 2.0 0.6 --
 Imports of goods and services 5.7 qoq. % ch 5.4 7.7 5.1 1.7 1.3 0.3 2.5 -0.3 --
   2005 2006 2007 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08
 Current account balance 5.8 Bn. EUR 15.5 -3.9 25.5 -7.2 -7.9 7.5 -15.3 -- --
 Direct investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR -216.4 -144.7 -94.8 -20.0 -29.9 -20.0 -18.8 -- --
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.10 Bn. EUR 131.4 266.3 253.9 -10.1 49.3 19.4 1.3 -- --
6 Prices  2005 2006 2007 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08
 HICP 6.1 yoy % ch 2.2 2.2 2.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.6 3.3 --
 Core HICP 6.2 yoy % ch 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.4 --
 Producer prices 6.3 yoy % ch 3.5 4.4 2.6 4.4 5.0 5.4 5.7 -- --
 Import prices6.4 Index 104.8 112.9 105.2 118.9 122.4 122.7 -- -- --
7 Monetary and financial indicators  2005 2006 2007 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 2.1 2.9 3.9 4.8 4.5 4.4 4.6 4.8 --
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 3.4 3.8 4.2 4.2 4.0 4.0 3.8 4.1 --
 ECB repo rate 7.3 % p.a. 2.0 2.8 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 --
 Stock markets 7.4 Index 3207.1 3793.3 4316.4 4386.4 4025.8 3776.6 3595.9 3768.1 --
 M3 7.5 yoy % ch 7.4 8.5 11.1 11.5 11.6 11.3 10.1 10.6 --
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 yoy % ch 8.1 11.0 10.8 11.2 11.1 10.9 10.8 10.6 --
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 1.24 1.26 1.37 1.46 1.47 1.47 1.55 1.58 --
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 109.0 110.9 115.7 119.9 120.7 120.6 124.2 126.7 125.6
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Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output   
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption   
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator 
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment   
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market   
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Total employment, domestic concept, seasonally and working day adjusted Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Wages and salaries. Labour cost index, industry and services (excluding 
public administration), nominal, working day adjusted  
ECFIN 
5 International transactions  
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 World trade Volume, 1998=100, seasonally adjusted CPB 
5.3 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob Eurostat 
5.4 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, cif Eurostat 
5.5 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob-cif Eurostat 
5.6 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.8 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions; before 1997 partly 
estimated 
ECB 
5.9 Direct investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
5.10 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
6 Prices   
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
6.4 Import prices Import unit value index for goods, 2000=100  Eurostat 
7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Ecowin 
7.2 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Ecowin 
7.3 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Ecowin 
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Ecowin 
7.5 M3  Seasonally adjusted moving average moving average (3 last months)  ECB 
7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
MFI loans to euro-area residents excluding MFIs and general government, 
monthly values: month end values, annual values: annual averages 
ECB 
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7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR Period averages ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
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